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Summary 
The Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission was established in 1975, and reestablished in June 1976 as a 
Subcommission of the newly formed Code Commission, with the responsibility to present a comprehensive 
revision of Alaska’s criminal code for consideration by the Alaska State Legislature. Tentative Draft, Part 5, 
includes the remaining substantive provisions of the draft Revised Criminal Code not covered in prior parts of 
the tentative draft: articles on general provisions, justification (part 2), and responsibility (mental disease or 
defect); remaining sections in the Offenses Against Property chapter (issuing a bad check, littering); articles 
on business and commercial offenses (part 2) and credit card offenses; offenses against the family; the 
remaining article in the Offenses Against Public Administration chapter (abuse of public office); two Offenses 
Against Public Order articles (riot, disorderly conduct, and related offenses; and offenses against privacy of 
communication); weapons and explosives; and miscellaneous offenses. Commentary following each draft 
statute is designed to aid the reader in analyzing the effect of the draft Revised Code on existing law and also 
provides a section-by-section analysis of each provision of the draft Revised Code. Appendices include 
derivations of each provision of the Code and amendments to provisions contained in the Tentative Draft, 
Parts 1–3. 
UAA is an AA/EO employer and educational institution and prohibits illegal discrimination against any individual: 
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Additional information 
As of 1975, Alaska’s criminal laws were based primarily on Oregon criminal statutes as they existed at the 
close of the nineteenth century, with new statutes added and old statutes amended over the succeeding 75 
years by Alaska territorial and state legislatures in a piecemeal approach to revision. This resulted in a 
criminal code containing outdated statutes, obsolete terminology, a number of overly specific statutes, a  
haphazard approach to mens rea (the culpable mental state with which a defendant must perform an act in 
order to be convicted of a crime) and the lack of a coherent, rational sentencing structure. 
The Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission was established in 1975 with the responsibility to present a 
comprehensive revision of Alaska’s criminal code for consideration by the Alaska State Legislature. (The 
Commission was reestablished in June 1976 as a Subcommission of the newly formed Code Commission.) 
Staff services for the Criminal Code Revision Commission and Criminal Code Revision Subcommission were 
provided by the Criminal Justice Center at University of Alaska, Anchorage (John Havelock, project executive 
director; Barry Jeffrey Stern, reporter/staff counsel; Sheila Gallagher, Reporter/Staff Counsel; and Peter Smith 
Ring, research director). The tentative draft proposed by the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission was 
substantially amended by the Alaska State Legislature prior to its approval as the Revised Alaska Criminal 
Code in June 1978 (effective January 1, 1980). 
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INTRODUCTION TO TENTP1.TIV.S DRAFT, PART 5 
Tentative Draft, Part 5, includes the rernaininy 
substantive provisions of the Revised Criminal Code. The 
final part of the Tentative Draft, Part 6, will be published 
February 1, 1978, and will include the Code's provision 
on sentencing. 
Tentative Draft, Part 4, was distributed in November, 
1977, and was composed of nine articles of the �evised Criminal 
Code - attempt and related offenses, part 2; arson, criminal 
mischief and related offenses, part 2; business and commercial 
offenses; escape and related offenses; offenses relating to 
judicial and other proceedings; obstruction of public adninistra­
tion; general provisions; prostitution and related offenses; 
and gambling offenses. 
Tentative Draft, Part 3/ was distributed in April, 1977, 
and was composed of five articles in the Offenses Against Prop­
erty chapter of the Revised Criminal Code - theft and related 
offenses, burglary and criminal trespass, arson and related 
offenses, forgery and related offenses and general provisions. 
Tentative Draft, Part 2, was distributed in March, 
1977, and was composed of seven articles of the Revised Criminal 
Code - general principles of criminal liability; parties to 
crime; justification; attempt and related offenses, part l; 
robbery; bribery and related offenses and perjury and related 
offenses. 
Tentative Draft, Part 1, was distributed in February, 
1977, and was composed of four articles contained in the Offenses 
1.
Against the Person chapter of the Revised Criminal Code -
criminal homicide, assault and related offenses, kidnapping 
and related offenses and sexual offenses. 
Commentary follows each article in the Tentative 
Draft and is designed to aid the reader in analyzing the effect 
of the Revised Code on existing law. The Commentary also 
provides a section-by-section analysis of each provision of 
the Revised Code. All references in the Commentary to 
Tentative Draft provisions contain the letters TD before the 
usual AS cite. 
The Subcommission has made a number of amendments 
to provisions appearing in Tentative Drafts, Parts 1 - 3. 
These amendments are listed in Appendix II. 
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
SECTION 
100 General Purposes 
110 Application of Title 11 
120 Limitations on Applicaoility 
130 All Offenses Defined by Statute 
140 Burden of Injecting the Issue 
150 Affirmative Defense 
Sec. 11.06.100. GENERAL PURPOSES. The general purposes of this 
title are to 
(1) insure the public safety by
(A) preventing the commission of offenses through the
deterrent influence of the sentences authorized; 
(B) confining those convicted when required in the
interests of public protection; and 
(C) correcting and rehabilitating those convicted;
(2) proscribe conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably
causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests; 
(3) give fair warning of the nature of the conduct consti­
tuting an offense and of the sentences authorized upon conviction;
(4) define the act or omission and accompanying mental state
that constitute each offense and limit the condemnation of conduct as 
criminal when it is without fault; 
(5) differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and
minor offenses and prescribe proportionate penalties for each; 
(6) avoid excessive, disproportionate, and arbitrary punish­
ments. 
Sec. 11.06.110. APPLICATION Of TITLE 11. (a) Except as provided 
in ch. 36 of this title, the provisions of this title govern the 
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20A 
construction of and punishment for any offense defined in this title and 
committed on or after the effective date,of this title, as well as the 
construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for the 
offense. 
(b) The provisions of this title do not apply to or govern the
construction of and punishment for any offense committed before the 
effective date of this title, or the construction and application of any 
defense to the prosecution for the offense. An offense shall be con­
strued and punished according to the law existing at the time of the 
commission of the offense in the same manner as if this title had not 
become law. 
(c) When all or part of a criminal statute is amended or repealed,
the criminal statute or part of it so amended or repealed remains in 
force for the purpose of authorizing the accusation, prosecution, con­
viction, and punishment of a person who violated the statute or part of 
it before the effective date of the amending or repealing Act. 
Sec. 11.06. 120. LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY. This title does not 
bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right to or liability for damages, 
penalty, forfeiture, or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered 
or enforced in a civi.l action, regardless of whether the conduct in­
volved in the proceeding constitutes an offense defined in this title. 
Sec. 11.06.130. ALL OFFENSES DEFINED BY STATUTE. No conduct 
constitutes an offense unless it is made an offense 
(1) by this title;
(2) by a statute outside this title; or
(3) by a regulation authorized by and lawfully adopted under
a statute. 
Sec. 11. 06. llf0. BURDEN OF INJECTING THE ISSUE. When the phrase 
"the defendant has the burden of injecting the issue of a defense" is 
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used in this title, it means that 
(i) some evidence must be admitted which places in issue the
defense; and 
(2) the state then has the burden of disproving the existence
of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Sec. 11.06. 150. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. When the phrase "affirmative 
defense" is used in this title, it means that 
(1) some evidence must be admitted which places in issue the
defense; and 
(2) the defendant has the burden of establishing the defense
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
5.
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. General Provisions 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11. 06. 100. GENERAL PURPOSES
The first section of Chapter 6 states the general 
philosophy upon which the Revised Code is based and serves 
as an aid in the interpretation of particular sections. A more 
specific provision on the purposes of sentencing appears in 
TD AS 11. 36.020. 
II. TD AS 11. 06.110. APPLICATION OF TITLE 11
Subsection (a) provides that the provisions of the 
Revised Code govern the construction of, defenses to and punish­
ment of all offenses in the Code committed after the effective 
date of revised title 11. The exception "except as provided 
in ch. 36 of this title" is included to allow the Code's sen­
tencing provisions to apply to offenses defined outside title 
11 which are classified as felonies or misdemeanors without 
further penalty provision. See TD AS 11. 36. 050 (a), (b). 
As to existing title 11 offenses committed before 
the effective date of the Revised Code, a savings clause is 
included in subsection (b) which provides that the law existing 
at the time of the commission of the offense governs the con­
struction of, defenses to and punishment of such offenses "in 
the same manner as if this title had not become law. " 
Subsection (c) provides that the amendment or repeal 
of a criminal statute does not affect the "accusation, prosecu­
tion, conviction and punishment" of a person who violated the 
statute prior to the effective date of the repeal or amendment. 
0 . 
A similar, more general provision is found in AS 01. 05. 021. 
III. TD AS 11. 06. 120. LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY 
This section is based on existing AS 11. 75. 010 and 
emphasizes that the applicability of criminal penalties to 
conduct prohibited in the Revised Code does not affect private 
rights of action available to victims of such conduct. 
The Revised Code does not, however, include pro­
visions authorizing treble damages for violation of specific 
statutes (compare AS 42. 20. 070 (authorizing treble damages 
for use by communications employees of information derived 
from telegraph messages) with TD AS 11.61. 220 (Unauthorized 
divulgence or use of communications)) since the Subcommission 
concluded that in many instances actual damages would be 
nominal. To expressly provide for an award of three times 
such damages might jeopardize existing rights to recover sub­
stantial punitive damages for wilful misconduct. TD AS 11. 
06.120 is expressly designed to remove any question that com­
pensatory and punitive damages can be recovered in appropriate 
cases in a civil action based on tortious conduct classified 
as an offense in the Code. 
IV. TD AS 11. 06. 130. ALL OFFENSES DEFINED BY STATUTE 
While the common law has been specifically made 
applicable to Alaska law by AS 01. 10. 010, there is strong 
indication that a conviction based on a violation of an uncodi­
fied common law crime would not withstand a constitutional 
7. 
challenge. In a prestatehood decision, Hatch v. United States, 
14 Alaska 594, 602 212 F. 2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954), the court 
adopted a position inconsistent with the recognition of 
common law crimes. The Ninth Circuit observed that "[w]hile 
ignorance of the law is no defense, it is conversely true 
that a law which has not been duly enacted is not a law, and 
therefore a person who does not comply with its provisions 
cannot be guilty of any crime." 
TD AS 11. 06. 130 requires all offenses to be declared 
by statute or regulation and has the effect of abolishing com­
mon law crimes which have not been specifically adopted by 
statute or regulation. This will have the effect of preventing 
the revival of ancient common law offenses, such as dueling, 
which have been dropped from the Code as anachronisms. That 
all offenses should be adequately described by statute or regula­
tion is dictated by fundamental fairness. 
V. TD AS 11. 06. 140; 150. BURDEN OF INJECTING THE ISSUE; 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Code establishes two classes of defenses. As 
to both, some evidence must be admitted which places in issue 
the defense. The defendant will usually come forward with 
some evidence of facts constituting the defense, unless 
those facts are supplied by the prosecution' s witnesses. 
See generally Alto v. State, 565 P. 2d 492, 497 (Alaska 1977) and 
cases cited therein. 
As to burdens of proof, two different rules are 
codified. If the defendant has the burden of injecting the 
8 • 
issue of the defense the prosecution is required to disprove 
the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. If, instead, the 
defense is labeled an affirmative defense, the defendant is 
required to establish the defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
The term "burden df injecting the issue" is new to 
existing law. The definition of that term in TD AS 11. 06. 140 
will be familiar to those who have used the existing insanity 
statutes. 
Existing AS 12. 45. 087(b) provides that "reliance 
on mental disease or defect as excluding responsibility is an 
affirmative defense. The burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not require the prosecution to disprove an affirmative 
defense unless and until there is evidence supporting the 
defense." The Supreme Court has further interpreted that 
statute by requiring that "some" evidence must be admitted 
before the prosecution is required to disprove mental disease 
or defect. Alto v. State, 565 P. 2d 492, 497 (Alaska 1977) 
In the Code, the burden of proof described in the 
insanity statute is not labeled an "affirmative defense" as 
it is currently; rather, the defendant is said to have "the 
burden of injecting the issue" of the defense. The term 
" affirmative defense" is reserved under the Code for defenses 
where the defendant has the burden of proof. 
The Code defines an affirmative defense as a defense 
that must be raised and established by the defendant by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence. There are 18 affirmative defenses 
9. 
in the Revised Code. The United States Supreme Court recently 
upheld the right of a state to require a defendant to prove 
certain defenses at trial. Patterson v. N. Y. , 97 S. Ct. 2319 
(1977) . 
The Alaska Supreme Court has also required a defendant 
to establish certain defenses at trial. In Batson v. State, 
No. 1486 (Alaska Sept 9, 1976), the court held that the 
defendant must establish the defense of entrapment by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence. Cf. Johansen v. State, 491 P. 2d 
759, 766-67 (Alaska 1971). In Johansen, the court held that 
in a contempt proceeding the burden of proof regarding ability 
to comply with a child support order is on the defendant. The 
court justified its classification of "inability to comply" 
as an affirmative defense by "finding that child support 
contempt is not wholly a criminal proceeding. " 491 P. 2d at 
767 n. 32. 
10. 
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CHAPTER 21. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION. 
Section 
100 - 210 See Tentative Draft, Part 2 
220 Justification: Performance of Public Duty 
230 Justification: Use of Physical Force, Special 
Relationships 
240 Duress 
250 Entrapment 
Sec. 11.21. 220. JUSTIFICATION: PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC DUTY. (a) 
Unless inconsistent with secs. 115 - 210 o� this chapter, conciuct which 
would otherwise constitute an offense is justified when it is required 
or authorized by law or by a judicial decree, judgment, or order. 
(b) The justification afforded by this section also applies when 
(1) the person reasonably believes his conduct to be required 
or authorized by a decree, judgment, or order of a competent court or 
tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal process, nothwithstanding 
lack of jurisdiction of the court or tribunal or defect in the legal 
process; or 
(2) the person reasonably believes his conduct to be required 
or authorized to assist a peace officer in the performance of his duties 
notwithstanding that the officer exceeded his authority. 
Sec. 11. 21. 230. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE, SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIPS. (a) The use of physical force upon another person 
that would otherwise constitute an offense is justified under any of 
the following circumstances: 
(1) A parent, guardian, or other person entrusted with the 
care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person may use rea­
sonable and appropriate nondeadly physical force upon that minor or 
incompetent person when and to the extent reasonably necessary and 
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appropriate to promote the welfare of the minor or incompetent �erson. 
(2) A teacher may, if authorized by school regulations, use 
reasonable ind appropriate nonrleadly physical force upon a student when 
and to the extent reasonabJ.y necessary and appropriate to maintain order 
in the school or classroom and when the use of that force is consistent 
with the welfare of the students. 
(3) A superintendent or other entrusted official of a 
correctional facility, in order to maintain order, m?.y use such reason­
able nondeadly physical force as is authorized by thE regulations 
adopted by the Department of Health and Social Services, when and to 
the extent reasonebly necessary to maintain order. 
(4) A person resronsible for the maintenance of orde.r in a 
connnon carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his direction, 
may use reasonable nondeadly physical force when and to the extent 
reasonably necessary to maintain order. 
(5) A person who reasonably believes that another is 
imminently about to connnit suicide may use reasonable nondeadly physical 
force upon that person when and to the extent reasonably necessary to 
prevent a suicide. 
(6) A licensed physician, paramedic, or registered nurse, 
or a person acting under his direction, or any person who renders 
emergency care at the scene of an emergency, may use reasonable non­
deadly physical force for the-purpose of administering a recognized 
and lawful form of treatment which is reasonably adapted to promoting 
the physical or mental health of the patient if 
(A) the treatment is administered with the consent of 
the patient, or if the patient is a minor or an incompetent person, 
with the consent of his parent, guardian, or other person entrusted 
with his care and supervision; or 
12. 
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(B) the treatment is administered in an emergency if the 
person administ€ring the treatment reasonably believes that no one 
competent to consent can be consulted under the circumstances and 
that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the 
patient, would conFent. 
(b) A person who raises a defense under (a) (l) of this section and 
claims that the person upon whom force was used was an incompetent has 
the burden of establishing that, at the time force was used, the person 
upon whom the force was used 
(1) was hospitalized under AS 47.30; or 
(2) could have been hospitalized upon court order under 
AS 47.30.070. 
Sec. 11.21.240. DURESS. (a) In a prosecution for an offense, it 
is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed 
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened use of 
unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or 
threatened force a reasonable person in his situation would have been 
unable to resist. 
(b) The defense of duress is not available when a person reck­
lessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he 
will be subject to duress. 
Sec. 11.21.250. ENTRAPMENT. In a prosecution for an offense, it 
is an affirmative defense that, in order to obtain evidence of the com­
mission of an offense, a public law enforcement official or a person 
working in cooperation with him induced the defendant to commit the 
offense by persuasion or inducement as would be effective to persuade 
an average person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit 
the offense. Inducement or persuasion which would induce only a person 
engaged in an habitual course of unlawful conduct for gain or profit 
does not constitute entrapment. 
LL 
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CHAPTER 21. General Principles of Justification (Part 2) 
CO�ENTARY 
I. TD PS 11.21.220. JUSTIFICATION: PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC 
DUTY 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.15. 090 provides that a homicide is justifiable 
when committed by a public officer or a person aiding the officer 
(1) in obedience to the judgment of a competent court; or (2) 
when necessarily committed in overcoming resistance to the 
execution of process or to the discharge of a legal duty. 
B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 11. 21. 220 provides the defense of justification 
to all p,osecutions under the Code if the chargeable conduct 
is requi-ed or authorized by law or judicial order. The Code 
provisio11 must be read in conjunction with the other, more 
specific, sections of the justification chapter which are 
intended to be controlling if applicable even though the conduct 
in question involves the performance of public duty. For 
example, TD AS ll. 21. 170 (b) specifies the circumstances when 
a peace officer may use deadly force in making an arrest. 
TD AS 11.21.220 does not expand that authority. Rather, sec. 
170 (b) explains the application of sec. 220 in a very specific 
circumstance. 
Subsection (a) of sec. 220 provides that statutes or 
court orders which impose a duty or grant a privilege to act 
may be f 1 )llowed without the actor incurring criminal liability. 
If a sta:utory provision, for example, permits a door to be 
14. 
broken down in the execution of a search warrant (AS 12. 35. 040) 
the officer has not committed criminal mischief in doing so. 
Similarly, the physician who acts pursuant to a court order 
permitting a blood transfusion has not committed assault. 
Under subsection (a), the conduct must in fact be 
authorized by law or judicial order; the actor's reasonable, 
though mistaken, belief is not sufficient to establish the 
defense. Subsection (b) provides two exceptions to the require­
ment of (a) when the actor has a reasonable belief that 
the conduct is required or authorized. The first involves a 
person who acts upon a court order that is defective for lack 
of jurisdiction but is reasonably believed by him to be authori­
tative. The second involves a person called upon by a peace 
officer for assistance that the person reasonably believes to 
be lawful. 
II. TD AS 11. 21. 230. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE -
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
TD AS 11.41. 230 deicribes six situations when the 
use of reasonable nondeadly physical force is justified based 
on the relationship between the actor and the person upon 
whom force was used. It must be emphasized that while the 
term "nondeadly physical force" as used in the Code encompasses 
all force short of the deadly variety, the degree of force used 
must, in all cases, be reasonable under the circumstances. If 
excessive force, even though nondeadly, is used, the force 
will not be justified. 
Existing law recognizes that a homicide is excusable 
15. 
when committed by " accident or misfortune in lawfully 
correcting a child. " AS 11. 15. 110 (1). See also L. A. M. v. 
State, 547 P. 2d 159, 175 (Alaska 1972) . Subsection (a) (1) 
allows parents, guardians and others entrusted with the care 
and supervision of a minor or incompetent person to use 
reasonable and appropriate nondeadly physical force when and 
to the extent reasonably necessary to promote the welfare of 
the minor or incompetent person. If force is used against an 
incompetent, the person who uses the force must also establish 
the person's incompetency under subsection (b). 
Subsection (a) (2) provides a limited privilege from 
criminal liability to a teacher to use force upon a student in 
certain situations. The sub.section prohibits the use of any 
physical force in the absence of a school regulation allowing 
it. Thus the detailed regulation of situations where physical 
force is allowable, the extent of force to be used and proce­
dural limitations on its use (such as who may administer the 
force) is l eft to the detailed regulation of school authorities 
within the context of each community. 
Even school regulations can only allow force that is 
" reasonable and appropriate' , "necessary and appropriate to 
maintain order" and "consistent with the welfare of the students. " 
The Subcommission rejected a proposal that would have 
required parental consent in all cases, being mindful of the 
broad definition of "physical force'  in the Code, which would 
include, for example, ejecting a student from a classroom, and the 
inappropriateness of application of the criminal law to a varietv 
16. 
of minor school altercations which might include, for example, 
a " hurry up" push, breaking up a fight in the classroom and a 
variety of other occasions where the use and abuse of physical 
force is best left to community and administrative regulation 
and the constraints of civil law. 
Subsection (a) (3) allows the use of reasonable nondeadly 
physical force by correctional facility officials to maintain 
order in a correctional facility when such force is authorized 
by the regulations adopted by·the Department of Health and Social 
Services. As with the school situation, the criminal law can 
provide only broad guidelines to behavior which should other­
wise be subject to controls pertinent to the requirements of 
specific situations. The use of deadly force in a correctional 
facility will be justified only when authorized by other pro­
visions of chapter 21. See TD AS 11. 21. 210, Use of physical 
force to prevent escape from correctional facility. 
Subsection (a) (4) provides that a person responsible for 
the maintenance of order on a common carrier of passengers 
may use reasonable nondeadly force to maintain order on the 
common carrier. This provision, for example, would authorize 
a bus conductor to use reasonable force to eject an intoxicated 
person who is harassing other passengers. As with the other 
subsections of this Code provision, deadly force will be 
justifiable only if authorized by other provist0ns of this 
chapter. See TD AS 11. 21. 140, Use of physical force in defense 
of third persons. 
17. 
Subsection (a) (5) is new to Alaska and reflects a 
value only relatively recently given expression in the criminal 
law. It supports the general policy of the law to discourage 
suicides. See TD AS 11. 41. llO(e) (defense to charge of murder, 
but not manslaughter, that defendant aided a suicide). 
Subsection {a) (6) authorizes the use of physical force 
when required for the administration of reasonably necessary 
medical treatment. Existing law contemplates that in emergency 
situations conduct that would otherwise constitute a criminal 
assault will not result in civil liability. See AS 09. 65. 090, 
Civil liability for emergency aid; AS 08. 61. 366, Liability 
for services rendered by a physician-trained mobile intensive 
care paramedic. 
Subsection (a) (6) (A) justifies the use of nondeadly 
force in a medical situation when administered with the consent of 
the patient, or if the patient is a minor or incompetent, the 
consent of a parent, guardian or other person entrusted with 
his care or supervision. Justification is extended by sub­
section (6) (B) to the use of force without consent of the 
patient only in emergency situations when no one competent to 
give consent is available under the circumstances, but when 
any reasonable person would give consent. 
III. TD AS 11. 21. 240. DURESS 
There is no existing statute in Alaska that recognizes 
the defense of duress though it has been raised in at least 
two recent cases. Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830, 841 n. 31 
(Alaska 1976); State v. Webb, No. 74-1734 (Super. Ct. , 3d 
18. 
Dist. 1974). TD AS 11. 2 1. 240 codifies the affirmative defense 
of duress. 
The Subcommission has limited the defense to situa­
tions where a person is coerced to act by ''the use or threatened 
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person. " 
The Subcommission perceived no valid reason for requiring: 
that the defendant suffer actual physical injury, that the 
imperiled victim be the defendant rather than another, that 
the defendant commit some crime other than murder or that 
the injury portended be immediate in point of time. It is 
expected, however, that these factors will be given evidential 
weight along with other circumstances in determining whether 
a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have 
been unable to resist the commission of the crime. 
The duress defense assumes that the defendant acted 
with the culpable mental state required for the particular 
offense, an element that the prosecution must establish beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Once the requisite level of culpability 
is established (for example, in the case of criminal possession 
of a forgery device, TD AS ll. 46. 520 (a) (1), that the defendant 
possessed the device with knowledge of its character) the 
defendant may escape liability if he proves by a preponderance 
of the evidence that although he acted with the necessary 
culpable mental state, he did so out of duress. Of course, if 
' duress" prevented him from forming the requisite culpable 
mental state, (for example, in the case of forgery, TD AS 
11. 46. 500, that the defendant while falsely making a written 
19. 
instrument, did not intend to defraud) the defense wou ld not 
have to be raised since the prosecution would be unable to 
establish the requisite elements of the offense in the first 
instance. 
Subsection (b) is intended as a guarantee against 
the claim of justification being raised by a defendant act ing 
with accomplices, e. g. , defendant argues that he fired a 
weapon during a hold-up only because his accomplice threatened 
to shoot him if he did not. In such an instance, it is 
likely that the jury would conclude that the defendant had 
recklessly placed himself in a situation "in which it [was] 
probable that he [ would ]  be subject to duress. " 
IV. TD AS 11. 20. 250. ENTRAPMENT 
Though there is currently no statute on entrap­
ment, the Alaska Supreme Court has recogni zed the defense. 
In Grossman v. State, 4 57 P.2d 2 2 6 ,  2 29 (1969) , the court 
adopted the " objective" approach to entrapment : 
[ U ] nlawful entrapment occurs when a public law en­
forcement official, or a person working in  cooperat ion 
with him, in order to obtain evidence of the commission 
of an offense, induces another person to commit such 
an offense by persuasion or inducement which would 
be effective to persuade an average person, other 
than one who is ready and willing, to commit such an 
offense. Conversely, instigations which would induce 
only a person engaged in an habitual course of unlawful 
conduct for gain or profit do not constitute entrapment. 
See also, Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830, 843- 4 6  (Alaska 1976) ; 
McKay v. State, 489 P. 2d 14 5, 149- 50 (Alaska 1971). 
In Grossman, the court adopted the minority opinion in 
Sherman v. United States, 3 56 U . S. 369 (1958) ( Frankfurter, J . ,  
20. 
dissenting) and explained both the policy benind the law of 
entrapment and the way in which that policy could best be 
effected : 
" The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, 
not because his conduct falls outside the proscription 
of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be 
admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the 
government to bring about conviction cannot be 
countenanced . . • .  Insofar as they are used as 
instrumentalities in the administration of criminal 
justice, the federal courts have an obligation to 
set their face against enforcement of the law by 
lawless means or means that violate rationally vin­
dicated standards of justice, and to refuse to sustain 
such methods by effectuating them. They do this in 
the exercise of a recognized jurisdiction to formulate 
and apply ' proper standards for the enforcement of 
the federal criminal law in the federal courts, ' . . . .  " 
356 U. S. at 380 . . . .  The minority then stated that 
the better way to further this policy is to focus the 
determination upon the character of the police conduct 
rather than upon the defendant ' s  predisposition. To 
rest the determination on the origin of intent is 
irrelevant because, "In every case of this kind the 
intention that the particular crime be committed 
originates with the police, and without their induce­
ment the crime would not have occurred . "  
457 P. 2d 226, 228 (quotj ng in p�rt from Sherman v. United States , 
356 U. S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J. , dissenting)) . 
The Alaska Court then concluded : 
We feel that the proper solution is the objective 
test which focuses the determination upon the parti­
cular conduct of the police in the case presented . 
Inducements should be limited to those measures which, 
objectively considered, are likely to provoke to the 
commission of crime only those persons, and not others, 
who are ready and willing to commit a criminal offense. 
457 P.2d at 229. 
The Code incorporates existing law by recognizing 
the "objective" approach to entrapment. Though the defense 
will continue to be tried by the court in the absence of a 
jury, codification of the defense in language virtually 
21. 
identical to that formulated by the Alaska Supreme Court 
in Grossman is desirable . 
In classifying entrapment as an affirmative defense, 
which must be raised and established by the defendant by a 
preponderance of the evidence , the Code provis ion is consis­
tent with existing Alaska practice. Batson v. State, No. 1486 
(Alaska, September 9, 1977). 
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CHAPTER 26. RESPONSIBILITY. 
Section 
010 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibi lity 
020 Evidence of Mental Disease or Defect 
Sec . 11.26 . 010. MENTAL DIS E ASE OR DEFECT EXCLUDING RESPONSIBILITY.  
(a) ·A  person ii not responsible for criminal conduct if at  the time
of the conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks 
substantial capacity eitqer to appreciate the wrongfulness of his con-
duct or to conform his co�duct to the requirements of law. 
_ (b) As used in this· section, the terms "mental disease or defect" 
do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal· or 
otherwise antisocial conduct. 
(c) The defendant has the burden of injec ting the issue of  a
defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility under this 
section .  
Sec. 11 . 26.020 . EVIDENCE OF MENTAL DISE ASE OR  DEFE CT. Evidence 
that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or de fect is admissi­
ble whenever it ·is relevant to prove that the de fendant did or did not 
have a culpable mentai s tate which is an element of the offense. How­
ever , evidence of mental /disease or defect excluding responsibility is 
not admissible unless the defendant , at the time o f  entering his plea of 
not guilty or within 10 <lays thereafter or at such later time as the 
court may for good cause permit , files a written notice of his intent to 
rely on that defense. 
2 0 A  
23.
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 26. Responsibility 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11. 26. 010; 0 20. MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT EXCLUDING 
RESPONSIBILITY; EVIDENCE OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT 
"Defense of mental disease or defect excluding 
responsibility" was recently examined by the legislature. 
Accordingly, the Subcommission has not recommended substantive 
changes in the statutes adopted in 1972. The Subcommission 
did, however, conclude that the provisions now found in existing 
AS 12. 45. 083 (a) , (b) and AS 12. 45. 085 more appropriately belong 
in the Revised Code. These provisions are reenacted in the 
Code as TD AS 11. 26. 010, 020. With the exception of these 
three substantive provisions, existing statutes in title 12 
applicable to the procedure to be followed upon a claim of a 
defense based on mental disease or defect excluding responsi­
bility will remain in title 12. 
TD AS 11. 26. 010, 020 differ from existing law in 
three nonsubstantive ways. The three changes discussed below 
either clarify existing law or conform existing law to the 
Code's uniform vocabulary . 
1. Existing law provides :  "The requirement of evidence 
supporting the affirmative defense [of mental 
disease or defect as excluding responsibility] is 
not satisfied solely by evidence of an abnormality 
which is manifested only by repeated criminal or 
otherwise antisocial language. " AS 12. 45. 083 (b ) .  
The Code rephrases this qualification in TD AS 
11. 26. 0l0 (b ) .  
2 4 . 
2 .  
3. 
Existing law provides : "Reliance on mental disease 
or defect as excluding responsibility is an affirm­
ative defense. The burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt does not require the prosecution 
to disprove an affirmative defense unless and 
until there is evidence supporting the defense. " 
AS 12.4 5. 083 (b ) .  This burden of proof is identical 
to the Revised Code's standard on "burden of injecting 
the issue" (TD AS 11. 06. 140, discussed in this Ten­
tative Draft) and this phrase is used in TD AS 
11. 26. 0.10. (c ) .  
Existing law provides : "Evidence that the defendant 
suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible 
whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant 
did or did not have a state of mind which is an 
element of the offense. " AS ia . 45. 085. In the 
Revised Code, the term "culpable mental state, " 
is used to refer to the four states of mind used 
throughout the Revised Code, and that term appears 
in TD AS 11. 26. 020 . 
25. 
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CHAPTER 46 . OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY. 
ARTICLE 1. THEFT AND RELATEQ OFFENSES. 
Section 
100 - 270 See Tentative Draft, Part 3 
280 Issuing a Bad Check 
Sec. 11. 46. 280 . ISSUING A BAD CHECK. (a) A person corrunits the 
crime of issuing a bad check if, knowing that he or his principal has 
insufficient funds with the drawee to cover the check, he utters a check 
and payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation . 
(b) When the drawer of a check has insufficient funds with the 
drawee to cover it at the time of utterance , the drawer or representa­
tive drawer is rebuttably presumed to know of that insufficiency. 
(c) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this 
section that the defendant or a person acting in his behalf made full 
satisfaction of the amount of the check with costs and fees within 10 
days after dishonor by the drawee. 
(d) As used in this section, 
(1) "drawer" means a person whose name appears on the check 
as the primary obligor, whether the actual signature be that of himself 
or of a person purportedly authorized to draw the check on his behalf; 
(2) "insufficient funds" means no funds with the drawee or 
funds with the drawee in an amount less than that of the check ; 
- (3) "representative drawer" means a person who signs a check 
as a drawer in a representative capacity or as agent of the person whose 
name appears on the check as the primary obligor ; 
(4) a person "utters" a check when, as a drawer or representa 
tive drawer of the check, he delivers it or causes it to be delivered to 
a person who thereby acquires a right against the drawer with respect to 
the check; one who draws a check with intent that it be so delivered is 
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considered to have uttered it if the delivery occurs. 
(e) Issuing a bad check is a class A misdemeanor. 
27. 
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ALAS�A REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 46. Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 1. THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Part 2) 
CO!1MEN'I' ARY 
I. TD AS 11.46.280. ISSUING A BAD CHECK 
A. Existing Law 
Bad check statutes were originally required by 
common law rules which prevented the application of the law 
of theft to issuing a bad check. See LaFave & Scott, 
CRIMINAL LAW at 679-680 (1972). The existing statute on 
issuing checks without funds or credit, AS 11.20.210, describes 
four prohibited acts, ranging from writing an insufficient funds 
check with knowledge of the insufficiency, to writing an other­
wise valid check but knowing that by the time it is presented 
for payment the account will be exhausted. Violation of the 
statute carries a maximum 1 year imprisonment and/or $1000 fine. 
AS 11.20.230 provides that if done with an intent 
to defraud, certain acts that violate sec. 230 ("makes, draws, 
utters or delivers to another person a check or draft on a 
bank or other depository for the payment of money, knowing at 
the time of the drawing or delivery that he does not have 
sufficient funds or credit") constitute larceny. AS 11.20.240 
provides. penal ties ranging from one month to ten years for 
violation of the statute based on the amount of the check. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code consolidates theft offenses. 
See Tentative Draft, Part 3 at 18-23. In doing so, common law 
28. 
technical defenses which have prevented bad check offenses 
from being prosecuted as theft have been eliminated. 
Check offenses which constitute theft should be 
prosecuted under the Code's theft statutes. Accordingly, the 
crime of issuing a bad check is redefined in the Code to cover 
the more limited area which protects public confidence in 
negotiable instruments in situations where theft is not neces­
sarily involved. 
The offense of issuing a bad check is committed when 
a person utters (defined in subsection (d) (4)) a check knowing 
that he or his principal has insufficient funds (defined in 
subsection (d) (2)) with the drawee to cover the check, and 
payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation. The Code 
provision thus differs substantially from the existing issuing 
checks without funds or credit statute. 
The primary reason for the departure from existing 
law is that the definition of "deception'' (TD AS 11.46.990(2) 
discussed in Tentative Draft, Part 3, at 33-34) makes it 
possible to prosecute the bad check utterer or passer under 
the general theft provisions of the Code on the basis of the 
property or services obtained in return for the bad check; the 
elimination of the promissory fraud doctrine eliminates the 
need for a bad check statute in its traditional form. Even if 
no property or service is obtained, the defendant can still be 
prosecuted for attempted theft. Additionally, instances of 
bad check schemes involving 10 or more victims can be prose­
cuted under the Code provision on scheme to defraud in the 
29. 
first degree, TD AS 11.46. 600, a class B felony. 
The Code provision applies only to the drawer or 
representative drawer (defined in subsections (d) (1) and (d) 
(3)) of the check. The person who passes an "NSF" check with 
knowledg� of the insufficiency can be prosecuted for theft, 
attempted theft, or if he acted in concert with the drawer, as 
an accessory to the crime of issuing a bad check. 
The Code provision also modifies existing law by 
requiring the presence of an additional element. While existing 
law in part prohibits uttering a check, "knowing at the time 
of the making, drawing, uttering or delivery that the maker 
or drawer does not have sufficient funds, " the Code provision 
further requires that payment be "refused by the drawee upon 
presentation." This provision is consistent with contemporary 
banking practices which sometimes allow checking patrons to 
overdraw their accounts. As noted in the commentary to the 
Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code: 
The important thing is not whether at the exact time 
that the instrument is written or passed the drawee 
happens to have received funds from or on heh�lf of the 
drawer. Rather, the important thing is that by the time 
the instrument is presented there is some reason to 
honor it. 
Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code, § 4040 at 277 (1967) . 
Under the rebuttable presumption provision in section 
(b) the state meets its initial burden of proving knowledge 
if it show3 that the issuer of the bad check had insufficient 
funds with the drawee at the time of the utterance. "[T]he 
drawer ... having both knowledge and control of his account, 
may fairJy be presumed to have intended the insufficiency 
30. 
which existed. 
354 (1975). 
" N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 190.05 Commentary at 
Subsection (c) provides an affirmative defense to 
prosecution for issuing a bad check. The defendant must estab­
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or a person 
acting on his behalf made full satisfaction of the check with 
costs and fees within 10 days after dishonor by the drawee. 
The provision effectively makes restitution within 10 days 
after dishonor a defense rather than a mitigating factor to 
be considered upon sentencing. 
Under subsection (c), the drawer may, at his peril, 
utter an NSF check believing he will cover it prior to presenta­
tion. The utterance becomes a crime if the check is not covered 
or made good within ten days of dishonor. The definition of 
the crime of issuing a bad check does not require that the 
drawer believe the check will be dishonored or that he act with 
an intent to defraud. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.05(1) (a), 
MO. REV. STAT. § 570.120 (1) (effective January 1, 1979). 
Because the bad check statute focuses on general 
confidence in negotiable instruments, the sanction provided 
for this offense, a class A misdemeanor, does not vary with the 
amount of the check. If prosecuted under the theft or attempt�d 
theft statute the penalty will vary according to the amount 
involved. 31. 
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CHAPTER 46. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY. 
ARTICLE 3. ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, AND RELATED OFFENSES. 
Section 
400 - 486 See Tentative Draft, Parts 3 and 4 
488 Littering 
Sec. 11.46.488. LITTERING. (a) A person commits the offense of 
littering if he recklessly places or throws litter on any public or 
private property or in any public or private waters without the consent 
of the owner and does not immediately remove it. 
(b) As used in this section, "litter" means any rubbish, refuse, 
garbage, offal, paper, glass, cans, bottles, trash, debris, or other 
foreign substance of whatever kind or description, whether or not it is 
of value. 
(c) Littering is a violation. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 46. Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 3. ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED DEFENSES (Part 3) 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11.46.488. LITTERING 
A. Existing Law 
Alaska currently has a very limited littering statute. 
AS 11. 20. 590, "Injury to highways, public recreation facilities, 
or highway signs, '' imposes criminal penalties on the person who 
puts or throws garbage or other substances on a "highway, high­
way right-of-way, or public recreation facility." It also 
prohibits the dumping of litter or trash onto private property 
but only if the actor puts or throws it from a "highway or high­
way right-of-way. " Penalties for such conduct include imprison­
ment for up to one year and/or a fine of not more than $500. 
Although "highway'' is broadly defined in AS ll. 20.590(f), no 
mention is made of public or private lands, strea.rns, rivers or 
lakes that may not be highways or "public recreation facilities" 
but may become repositories for litter. 
While several statutes outside title 11 prohibit 
maintaining air, land and water nuisances, these provisions 
are principally directed at protection of public health. See, 
e.g., AS 46.03. 800 (prohibiting water nuisance but only if 
water is or may be used for domestic purposes); AS 46.03.810 
(prohibits as air and land nuisance only the dumping of 
materials that would be "obnoxious, or cause the spread of 
disease or in any way endanger the health of the community"). 
Other statutes provide some protection for state land and 
33. 
waters but are directed principally at curtailing large 
scale pollution. See, e.g., AS 46.03.740, Oil Pollution; 
AS 46.03.750, Ballast water discharge. These provisions, which 
allow for a more severe response to aggravated situations, are 
not disturbed by the Code provision. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code broadens the existing law on littering on 
the highway by providing that littering, a violation, is com­
mitted by one who throws litter onto any public or private 
property or waters without the consent of the owner and does 
not immediately remove it. "Litter" is broadly defined in 
subsection (b) to include any foreign substance, whether or 
not it is of value. 
The aggravated offense of "Obstruction of Highways, " 
TD AS 11. 61. 150, covers situations where the dumping constitutes 
a hazard to public safety and is treated as a B misdemeanor. 
34. 
2 CHAPTER 116. OFFEHSES AGAINST PROPERTY. ARTICLE 5. BUSINESS AND CO'.-rl1ERCIAL O�'FHlSF.S. 
Section 
600-700 See Tentative Draft, Part 4 
710 Deceptive Business Practices 
720 Misrepresentation of Use of a Propelled Vehicle 
730 Defrauding Secured Creditors 
740 Defrauding Judgment Creditors 
750 Fraud in Insolvency 
Sec. 11.46. 710. DECEPTIVE BUSINESS Pl{ACTICES. (a) A person 
commits the crime of deceptive business practices if, jn the course of 
engaging in a business, occupation, or profession, he 
(1) makes or causes to be made a false statement in an adver­
tisement or com..�unication addressed to the public or to a substa�tial 
number of persons in connection with the pror.;otion of the �a le of pro?­
erty or services or to increase the consumption of property or sc::vices; 
(2) makes or causes to be made a material false statement to 
any person in connection with the sale of property or services; 
(3) uses or possesses for use a false weight or measure, or 
any other device for falsely determining or recording any quality or 
quantity; 
(4) sells, offers for sale, exposes for sale, or delivers 
less than the represented quantity of a commodity or service; 
(5) sells, offers for sale, or exposes for sale adulterated 
conunodities; or 
(6) sells, offers for sale, or exposes for snle mislabeled 
commodities. 
(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the 
�efendant did not act at least rc�klessly. The burden of injecting the 
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i_ssuc of this defense is 0:1 the clcfenclcrn.t. 
(c) As used in (2.) (1) of this section, ''fr.lsc sU,tcrnc·nt" incli...:'.-::s 
but.is not limited ta an offer to sell or p�ovidc prop�rly or s2rvic�z 
if the offcror does not intend to sell. or 
perty or services 
. ' prOVl.(J.C 
(1) at the price or of the qu_ality .idvertised; 
(2) in· a quc.ntity sufficient to meet th<:> rcasoncibly e:-:;:2cted 
public demand unless quantity j s specifically stated in the advertis-::­
ment; or 
(3) at all. 
(d) As used in this section, 
(1) "adulterated" r.:c�n�: Vc•r·yinz. fr.om the standard of cc:;1-
position or quality prescribed by statute or administrative r�gu!ati0:1 
or, if none, as set by established co�nercial usage; 
(2) "mislabeled" means 
(A) varying from the standard of truth or disclo�ure in 
labeling prescribed by statute or administrafive �cgulation or, if 
none, as s�t by established co:mnercial usage; or 
(B) represented as being another perso�•s product, 
though otherwise labeled accurately as to quality and quantity. 
(e) _Deceptive business practices is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.46. 720. MISREPRESENTATION OF USE OF A PROPELLED VEHICLE. 
(a) · A person commits tr�e crime of n1isreprcsentation of use of a pro­
pelled· vehicle if, with intent to deceive any person, he sells, leases, 
or offers or exposes for sale or lease a propelled vehicle kno�ing that 
'• 
a usage registering device on the vehicle has been disconnected, ad­
justed or replaced so as to misrepresent the miles traveled by the 
vehicle or the hours of engine use. 
(b) As used in this section, "usar;e registering device" me2.ns any 
36. 
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odometer, specdo:i1ctcr, rccordin� tacho;;,_et.cr, hoobsi.1£t.c:;:, or oth!:·, 
instrument thal rE'gist crs th(, miles tr2.vclcd by the vehicle or the 
hours of engine use. 
(c) Misrepresentation of use of a propelled vchiclri is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 46.730. DEFRAUDING SF:CURED CREDITO��S. (a) A J>C;rson 
commits the crime of dcf1:auding secured creditors if, kno,-1inr; t.h:i.t 
property is subject to a security interest, he 
(1) intentiono.lly fails to disclose thD.t intcrct.t to ·a buyer. 
of the property; or 
(i) destroys, reQoves, conceals, encu��crs, transfers, or 
otherwise deals with property subject to 2 sccuri Ly intcrc,st \•:ith 
intent to hinder enforcement of that interest. 
(b) Defrauding secured creditors is a class A misderneanor. 
Sec. 11. 46. 7lf0. DEFRAUDING JUDGMENT CREDITORS. (a) A person 
conunits the crime of defraLtding judgment creditors if he assigns, 
secretes, conveys, or otherwise disposes of his propefty with intent to 
defraud an exis�ing judgment creditor. 
(b) Defrauding judgment creditors is a �lass A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.46. 750. FRAUD IN INSOLVENCY. (a) · A person co1:1mits the 
crime of _fraud in insol'vency when, knowin� that proceedings ltave bce:1 
or are about to be instituted for the appointment of an administrator 
or that� composition agreement or other arrangement for the benefit of 
creditors has been or is about to be made, he, with intent to defraud 
any creditor, 
(1) conveys, transfers, removes, conceals, destroys, en­
cumbers, or otherwise disposes of any part of or interest i.n the 
debtor's estate; 
(2) obtains a substantial part of or interest in the de�tor's 
37. 
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estate; 
(3) prcsent.s to .:iny creditor or to the: 2thinistrator a 
\..'r�.ting or record rel2tinr; to the dcLtor's cst2tc kuu:int:: th?.t: it 
I 
contains a false statem�nt; or 
(4) misrepresents or fails to disclose to the administrator 
the existence, a�ount, or location o( any part of or interest in the 
debtor's estate, 'or any othe.r inforn,otion \;hich he is legally rcqui.n·d 
to furnish to the administr2tor. 
(b) As used in this section, ''c>.dministrator." rnca_ns c>.,1 assiinec o::­
trustee for the benefit of creditors, a liquidato,, a receive-::-, or atty 
other person entitled to administer property for the benefit of crecl:i.­
tors. 
(c) Fraud in insolvency is 2 cl a�s A rr.i.sdc::10,:mo;:. 
r, 
38. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 46. Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 5. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL OFFENSES (Part 2) 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11.46. 710. DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 
A. Existing Law 
Currently, deceptive business practices are pro­
hibited by the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Act. AS 45.50. 471-.561. Section 551 of the Act provides both 
civil and criminal penalties for engaging in the 25 prohibited 
acts listed in AS 45.50. 471. Criminal penalties are available 
when the defendant engages in a "course of conduct" declared 
unlawful by section 471. AS 4 5 . 5 0 • 5 5 1  ( c ) . 
In addition, numerous statutes and regulations out­
side title 45 prohibit deceptive business practices. These 
provisions overlap, carry inconsistent penalty provisions and 
often fail to specify the culpable mental state element. 
For example, AS 17.05. 060 sets the required vitamin 
and mineral content of flour. AS 17. 05. 150 prescribes a fine 
of not more than $200 or imprisonment for not more than 30 
days for a violation of section 060. A more general provision 
appearing in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, AS 17.20.290(1), 
prohibits the sale of any adulterated food. A penalty of imprison­
ment for not more than 6 months and/or a fine o.f not more than 
$500 is authorized for violations of section 290. AS 17:20.310. 
Aside from the inconsistent penalty provisions 
39. 
applicable to these two overlapping statutes, no culpability 
requirement is specified. While the legislature may have 
intended to provide for strict liability for the sale of any 
adulterated good, other overlapping provisions specify culpa­
bility. AS 17.05.020, for example, provides that a person 
"who sells or offers for sale a substance [intended for meat 
or drink] knowing it is adulterated" is guilty of an offense 
carrying a three month to one year sentence or a $50-$500 fine. 
Numerous other examples exist. The statutes just 
discussed are included merely as a sample of the inconsistent 
and confusing maze of criminal provisions now regulating this 
area. 
B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 11.46.710 prohibits six forms of deceptive 
business practices and classifies the prohibited conduct as 
a class A misdemeanor. The offense of deceptive business 
practices differs from the crime of theft since there is no 
requirement that the defendant obtain property or that he 
act intentionally. 
Upon passage of the Revised Code, the existing 
criminal penalties applicable for a violation of the Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act as well as the 
criminal penalty provisions found in overlapping deceptive 
business practices statutes and regulations outside title 45 
would be repealed. The Code provision will provide a uniform 
penalty provision and culpable mental state requirement for 
the deceptive business practices prohibited by TD AS 11. 45.710. 
40. 
With the exception of the criminal penalty provisions, however, 
the existing statutes and regulations outside title 11 regulating 
similar conduct would not be repealed, and could be enforced 
civilly. 
Though the offense of deceptive business practices 
is initially defined as one of strict liability, subsection (b) 
provides that once the defendant denies that he acted with a 
culpable mental state, the state must establish that the defend­
ant acted at least recklessly. Mere civil negligence, or even 
criminal negligence, will not be sufficient to establish a vio­
latiori of the statute once the issue of culpability is raised. 
As under the existing Unfair Trade Practices Act, prohibited 
forms of deceptive business practices require that the defend­
ant commit the prohibited act while "in the course of engaging 
in a business, occupation or profession." 
The first form of deceptive business practice 
prohibited by the statute is false advertising. Subsection (a) (1) 
prohibits the making of a false statement in any advertise-
ment or communication addressed to a substantial number of 
persons. The definition of "false statement'' in subsection (c) 
is drafted so as to specifically include conduct commonly 
referred to as " bait advertising," a practice now prohibited 
under AS 4 5 . 5 0 . 4 71 ( b ) ( 8 ) , ( 9 ) . 
Subsection (a) (2) prohibits the making of any material 
false statement in connection with the sale of property or 
services. Note that there is no requirement that the statement 
be part of an advertisement or made to a substantial number of 
persons; a single statement to a single person will be sufficient. 
41. 
The prosecution must, however, establish that the statement 
was material to the transaction. Thus, the auto repairman 
who makes the single false statement to a customer that he 
has been repairing auto transmissions for ten years will 
violate the statute if his statement is likely to affect the 
customer's decision to l eave his car with him. 
Subsection (a) (3) prohibits a person from using 
or possessing a false weight or measure for falsely determin­
ing or recording any measurement of quality or quantity. 
Subsection (a) (4) prohibits a person from selling, offering 
for sale or delivering less than the represented quantity of 
a commodity or service. 
Subsections (a) (5) and (a) (6) prohibit a person from 
selling, offering for sale or exposing for sale adulterated 
or mislabeled commodities. The terms " adulterated" and "mis­
labeled" are defined in TD AS 11. 46. 710 (d) (1) , . 710 (d) (2) . 
Note that the determination of whether a commodity is " adul­
terated" or "mis.labeled" is based, for the most part, on existing 
statutes and regulations. Thus TD AS 11. 46. 710 operates as a 
"piggy-back" provision on already existing statutes and 
regulations; it does not determine what is adulterated or 
mislabeled, it merely punishes the sale of such commodities. 
II. TD AS 11. 46. 720. MISREPRESENTATION OF USE OF A PROPELLED 
VEHICLE 
A. Existing Law 
AS 45. 50. 471(18) provides that "disconnecting, turning 
back or resetting the odometer of a vehicle to reduce the 
42. 
number of miles indicated" is a deceptive act in the conduct 
of trade or commerce. Criminal penalties for violation of the 
statute are provided in AS 45 . 50.551. The person who engages 
in a course of conduct declared unlawful by section 471 may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for up to a year and/or $1, 000 fine. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code provision on misrepresentation of use of 
a propelled vehicle provides that it is a class A misdemeanor 
to sell or lease a propelled vehicle with intent to deceive and 
with knowledge that the usage registering device on the vehicle 
has been disconnected, adj usted or replaced to misrepresent 
the miles traveled by the vehicle or the hours of engine use. 
As defined in subsection (b) , "usage registering devices" 
would include recording tachometers, hobbsmeters and similar 
instruments as well as devices commonly associated only with 
automobiles such as speedometers and odometers. The effect 
of this definition is to extend the coverage of the statute 
to airplanes, construction equipment and other propelled 
vehicles the use of which is measured by hours of operation 
rather than miles traveled. 
Unlike existing law, the statute does not require 
that the seller or lessor tamper with the device . Sale or 
lease with intent to deceive and with knowledge of the tampering 
will violate the statute. 
III. TD AS 11.46.730. DEFRAUDING SECURED CREDITORS 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.20.400 provides "a person who, with intent to 
43. 
defraud, conveys goods, chattels, or personal property to 
which he does not have title or which is sub j ec t  to a lien, 
pledge, conditional sale contract, mortgage or other security 
interest without informing the buyer of the existence and 
effect of the security interest" is punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than one year, and/or a $5 00  fine. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code provisions on theft are drafted in terms of 
appropriation of " property of another. ' '  A security interest , 
however, does not make the secured party an owner; the property, 
by reason of the security interest alone, is not the " property 
of another." See TD AS 11.46.990 (8) , Tentative Draft, Part 3, 
at 10.2 ("property of another" defined). This limitation makes 
necessary specific coverage of the disposal by debtors o f  property 
subj ect to a security interest in ways that hinder enforcement 
o f  the interest by the creditor. 
The Code provision may be violated in either of two 
ways. The first is by selling secured property and inten­
ti onally failing to disclose the existence of the security 
interest to the buyer . The second is by dealing with the secured 
property with intent to hinder enforcement of the security 
interest. 
Defrauding secured creditors is classified as a 
class A misdemeanor, regardless of the value of the secured 
property involved. This treatment differs from the classifi­
cation of theft offenses into three degrees depending on the 
value of the property. The person who interferes with property 
4 4 .  
in his possession that is subject to a security interest is 
viewed as engaging in less serious behavior than the person 
who takes property upon which no reasonable claim to possession 
could have been made. It must be stressed, however, that in 
cases where it can be established that the defendant, at the 
time he undertook the security obligation, intended to commit 
a fraud, felony penalties will be available under the general 
theft provisions. 
IV. TD AS 11.46.740. DEFRAUDING JUDGMENT CREDITORS
A. Existing Law
AS 34.40.010 provides that "a conveyance or a�sign­
ment, in writing or otherwise, of an estate or interest in 
lands, or in goods. made with the intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful suits, 
damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands . . .  as against the 
persons so hindered, delayed, or defrauded is void." 
B. The Code Provision
The Code provision differs from existing law by specif­
ically providing criminal penalties for the act of defrauding an 
existing judgment creditor. The defendant must secrete, 
assign, convey or otherwise dispose of his property with the 
intent to defraud an existing judgment creditor. Such conduct 
parallels that proscribed by TD AS 11.46.730, Defrauding secured 
creditors, and is classified accordingly as a class A misdemeanor. 
V. TD AS 11.46.750. FRAUD IN INSOLVENCY
A. Existing Law
See discussion of AS 11.34.010 at IV, A, supra.
45.
B. The Code Provision
The fraud in insolvency statute closes a gap in
existing law. The Federal Bankruptcy Act's criminal penalties 
are applicable only when an insolvent files for bankruptcy. 
Not every insolvent will do so; he may choose instead to reach 
an informal settlement with his creditors - a composition agree­
ment. Despite the identity of conduct and intent, fraudulent 
acts pursuant to a composition agreement may not be punishable 
under existing law. The Code provision insures that specified 
conduct done with an intent to defraud a creditor will be 
subject to criminal penalties regardless of whether the insolvent 
has filed for bankruptcy. 
To commit fraud in insolvency, a class A misdemeanor, 
the defendant must know that proceedings have been or are about 
to be instituted for the apointment of an administrator (defined 
in subsection (b)) or that a composition agreement or similar 
arrangement has been or is about to be made. Acting with that 
knowledge and with an intent to defraud, the defendant must 
engage in one of the four forms of conduct described in sub­
sections (a)(l)-(4). 
46.
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means is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 46. 810. FORGERY OF A CREDIT CARD. (a) A person connnits 
the crime of .forgery of a credit card if , with intent to defraud, he 
( 1 )  makes or draws , in whole or in part, a device or instru­
ment which purports to be the credit card of a named issuer but which is 
not such a credit card becaus e that issuer did not authorize the making 
or drawing ; 
(2) without the authorization of the named issuer , completes 
a credit card by adding any of the matter, other than the signature of 
the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card 
issued by it before the credit card may be used by a cardholder ; 
(3) as other than the cardholder or a person authorized by 
him, signs the name of any actual or fictitious person to a credit card ; 
(4) alters a credit card which was validly issued ; or 
(5) utters a device , ins trument, or credit card that has been 
made, drawn, completed , signed , or altered in violation of this s ection . 
(b) Forgery of a credit card is a class C felony . 
Sec. 11. 46.820. FRAUDULENT USE OF A CREDIT CARD. (a) A person 
commits the crime of fraudulent us e of a credit card if , with intent to 
defraud , he 
(1) uses for the purpos e of obtaining property or s ervices a 
credit card obtained or retained illegally or a credit card which he 
knows is forged, expired, cancelled , or revoked ; or 
(2) obtains property or s ervices by 
(A) representing that he is the holder of a credit card , 
and the card has not in fact been issued ; or 
(B) representing, without the consent of the cardholder, 
that he is th� holder of a specified credit card. 
(b) Fraudulent use of a credit card is a 
48. 
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(1) class C felony if the value of the property or services 
obtained is $500 or more ; 
(2) class A misdemeanor if the value of the property or 
services obtained is $50 or more but less than $500 ; 
(3) class B misdemeanor if the value of the property or 
services obtained is less than $50 . 
Sec. 11 . 46 . 830. FRAUD BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE PROPERTY 
OR SERVICES. (a) A person who is authorized by an issuer to provide 
property or services or any agent or employee of that person commits the 
crime of fraud by a person authorized to provide property or services 
if, with intent to defraud, he 
(1) furnishes property or services upon presentation of a 
c redit card obtained, retained, or used illegally or a c redit card which 
he knows is forged, expired, cancelled, or revoked; or 
(2)  fails to furnish property or services which he represents 
in writing to the issuer or a participating party that he has furnished. 
(b) Fraud by a person authorized to provide property or services 
is 
(1) under (a) (l) of this section 
(A) a class C felony if the value of the property or 
services furnished is $500 or more ; 
(B) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property 
or services furnished is $50 or more but less than $500 ; 
(C) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property 
or services furnished is less than $50 ; 
(2) under (a) (2) of this section 
(A) a class C felony, if the difference between the value 
of the property or services actually furnished, if any, and the 
value represented is $500 or more ; 
49. 
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(B) a class A misdemeanor if the difference between the 
value of the property or services actually furnished, if any , and 
the value represented is $50  or more but less than $500 ; 
(C) a class B misdemeanor is the difference between the 
value of the property or services actually furnished, if any, and 
the value represented is less than $50 . 
Sec .  11. 46.840. POSSESSION OF MACHINERY, PLATE, OR OTHER CONTRI­
VANCE OR INCOMPLETE CREDIT CARD . (a) A person commits the crime of 
possession of machinery, plate, or other contrivance or incomp lete 
credit card if he 
(1) possesses an incomp lete credit card with intent to 
complete it without the consent of the issuer ; or 
(2) possesses, with knowledge of its character, machinery, 
plates, or any other contrivance designed to reproduce an instrument or 
device p urporting to be the credit card of an issuer, and the issuer has 
not consented to the preparation of the credit card. 
(b) A credit card is "incomplete" if part of the matter, other 
than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear 
on the credit card before it may be used by a cardholder has not yet 
been stamped, embossed, imprinted, or written on it . 
(c) Possession of machinery, plate, or other contrivance or in­
complete credit card is a class C felony . 
Sec. 11. 46. 8 5 0 .  RECEIPT OF ANYTHING OF VALUE OBTAINED BY FRAUD­
ULENT USE OF A CREDIT CARD. (a) A person commits the crime of receipt 
of anything of value obtained by fraudulent use of a credit card if he 
buys or receives property or services obtained in violation of sec. 820 
of this chapter knowing that the property or services were so obtained . 
(b) Receipt of anything of value obtained by fraudulent use of a 
credit card is 
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(1) a class C felony if the value of the property or services 
bought or received is $500 or more; 
(2) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property or 
services bought or received is $50 or more but less than $500; 
(3) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property or 
services bought or received is less than $50. 
Sec. 11.46.860. DEFINITIONS. As used in secs. 800 - 860 of this 
chapter, unless the context requires otherwise, 
(1) "cancelled or revoked credit card" means a credit card 
which is no longer valid because permission to use it has been sus­
pended, revoked, or terminated by the issuer; 
(2) "cardholder" means the person 
(A) named on the face of a credit card to whom or for 
whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer; or 
(B) in possession of a credit card with the consent of 
the person to whom the credit card was issued; 
(3) "credit card" means any instrument or device, whether 
known as a credit card, credit plate, courtesy card, or identification 
card or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for 
the use of the cardholder in obtaining property or services on credit; 
(4) "expired credit card" means a credit card which is no 
longer valid because the term shown on it has elapsed; 
· (5) "forged" refers to conduct which violates sec. 810 of 
this chapter; ·· 
(6) "issuer" means the business organization or financial 
institution, or its authorized agent, which issues a credit card; 
(7) "participating party" means a business organization or 
financial institution which is obligated or permitted by contract to 
acquire from a merchant a sales slip, sales draft, or instrument for the 
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payment of money evidencing a credit card transaction and from whom 
an issuer is obligated or permitted by contract to acquire that sales 
slip, sales draft, or instrument; 
(8) "receives" or "receiving" means acquiring possession or 
control or accepting as security for debt. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 46. Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 6. CREDIT CARD OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
A. Existing Law 
Credit cards are subject to extensive coverage 
in existing law. Eleven statutes contained in AS 11.22, 
Alaska Credit Card Crimes Act, (enacted, 1970) provide 
criminal penalties for such conduct as the theft of a credit 
card, AS 11. 22.010; forgery of a credit card, AS 11.22.050; 
and receipt of anything of value obtained by fraudulent use 
of a credit card, AS 11.22. 110. Two statutes proscribe 
frauds committed by merchants who accept credit cards. 
AS 11. 22.080, 090. 
B. The Code Provisions 
Because existing Alaska law now contains specific 
and comprehensive coverage of credit card offenses, and 
because those statutes are of recent origin, the Subcomr.lission 
concluded that existing chapter 22 should be reenacted in the 
Revised Code as a separate article to be included in Chapter 
46, Offenses Against Property, despite some overlapping with 
the Code's general theft and forgery provisions. 
To conform the existing credit card act with the 
rest of the Code, several nonsubstantive language changes 
were required. ,Additionally, a number of statutes were con­
solidated. Finally, the Subcommission classified credit 
card offenses for sentencing purposes in a manner consistent 
with the Code's classification of theft and forgery offenses. 
53. 
A comparison between the Code's article on credit card offenses 
and existing law follows below. 
1. TD AS 11.46.800. THEFT OF A CREDIT CARD OR OBTAINING 
A CREDIT CARD BY FRAUDULENT MEANS 
The Code provision consolidates existing AS 
11.22.010-040. The crime is classified as a class A 
misdemeanor consistent with the existing maximum one 
year sentence of imprisonment authorized for viola­
tions of AS 11.22.010-040. 
2. TD AS 11.46.810. FORGERY OF A CREDIT CARD 
The Code provision consolidates existing AS 
11.22.050 and 060. The crime is classified as a class 
C felony, consistent with AS 11.22.050 and the CodP's 
general forgery statute, TD AS 11.46. 500. The class C 
felony classification, however, increases the sentence 
authorized for signing the credit card of another, which 
currently carries a maximum one year sentence. AS 
11. 22. 060. Subsections. (3) and (_5) of the Code provi­
s.i.on expand existing law by including within the statute, 
uttering, with intent to defraud, a credit card that 
has been improperly signed. 
3. TD AS 11.46.820. FRAUDULENT USE OF A CREDIT CARD 
The Code provision is based on existing AS 
11.22.070. As with the remaining sections of the 
chapter, the phrase "property or services" is 
substituted for the existing phrase "money, goods, 
54. 
services or anything else of value. " The Code's 
general definition of property, TD AS 11. 46.990(7) 
specifically includes any "thing of value, including 
but not limited to money. " 
Punishment for violation of the statute differs 
somewhat from existing law. Currently, two degrees 
of the crime exist: a maximum one year sentence is 
authorized if the value of the property obtained 
does not exceed $500 in any six month period; if 
the value exceeds $500, the maximum sentence is 
increased to three years. 
Under the Code, three degrees of the crime 
exist. This degree structure is consistent with 
the three degrees of theft in the Code (TD AS 11. 
46. 130-150, discussed at Tentative Draft Part 3, at 
25-27) which provide class C felony penalties if the 
value of the property is $500 or more, class A misde­
meanor penalties if the value is less than $500, and 
clas·s B misdemeanor penal ties if the value is less 
than $50. 
The Code provision does not contain a specific 
reference to aggregation of property or services 
obtained during a six month period, since TD AS 11. 
46. 980, applicable to all property offenses provides 
that "in determining the degree of an offense under 
this chapter, amounts involved in criminal acts com­
mitted under one course of conduct, whether from the 
55. 
same person or several persons shall be c;tggregated." 
See discussion at Tentative. Draft, Part 3 at 28, 
4. TD AS 11.46.830. FRAUD BY PERSON AUTHORIZED TO 
PROVIDE PROPERTY OR SERVICES 
This section consolidates existing AS 11.22.080 and 
090. The penalty structure for the offense parallels 
that described in Section 3, supra. 
5. TD AS 11.46.840. POSSESSION OF MACHINERY, PLATE, OR 
OTHER CONTRIVANCE OR INCOMPLETE CREDIT CARD 
This section is taken from existing AS 11.22.100. 
The offense is classified as a C felony. While 
existing law prohibits possession of two or more 
incomplete credit cards or a device to make credit 
cards, . the Code provision also covers posse·s:s.ion of 
a single card or a device to make a single credit 
card without th.e consent of the is.s·uer. 
6. TD AS 11.46.850. RECEIPT OF ANYTHING OF VALUE OBTAINED 
BY FRAUDULENT USE OF A CREDIT CARD 
This section is based on existing AS 11.22.110. 
While existing law provides a maximum 1 year sentence 
for violation of the statute, the Code provision allows 
for felony prosecutions if the value of the property 
or services obtained is $500 or more. The culpable 
mental state for violation of the statute is "knowing" 
consistent with the Code's theft by receiving statute, 
TD AS 11. 4 6 . 18 0 . 
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CHAPTER 51. OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY. 
Section 
100 Endangering the Welfare of a Minor in the First Degree 
110 Endangering the Welfare of a Minor in the Second Degree 
120 Criminal Nonsupport 
125 Failure to Permit Visitation with a Minor 
130 Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor 
135 Unlawful Exploitation of a Minor 
140 Unlawful Marrying 
150 Failure to Comply with Order of Peace Officer to Leave 
Dwelling 
Sec. 11.51.100. ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A MINOR IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE. (a) A person commits the crime of endangering the welfare of a 
minor in the first degree if, being a parent, guardian or other person 
legally charged with the care of a child under 10 years of age, he 
intentionally deserts the child in any place under circumstances creat­
ing a substantial risk of physical injury to the child. 
(b) Endangering the welfare of a minor in the first degree is a 
class C felony. 
Sec. 11.51.110. ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A MINOR IN THE SECOND 
DEGREE. (a) A person having custody or control of a child under 13 
years of age co�nits the crime of endangering the welfare of a minor in 
the second degree if, with criminal negligence, he 
(1) leaves the child unattended under such circumstances as 
to create a substantial risk of physical injury lo the child; 
(2) subjects the child to cruel confinement; (3) subjects the child to cruel punishment; or 
(4) deprives the child of necessary food, clothing, or 
shelter. 
LA- L 20A 57. 
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(b) Endangering the welfare of a minor in the second degree is a 
class B misdemeanor. 
Sec:. 11. Si
°
.120, CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT. (a) A person commits the 
crime of criminal nonsupport if, being a person legally charged with the 
support of a child under 18 years of age, he refuses or neglects without 
lawful excuse to provide support for the child. 
(b) As used in this section "support" includes, but is not limited 
to, necessary food, care, clothing, shelter, medical attention, and 
education. There is no failure to provide medical attention to a child 
if he is provided treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in 
accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or 
religious denomination by an accredited practitioner of the church or 
denomination. 
(c) Criminal nonsupport is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.51. 125. FAILURE TO PERMIT VISITATION WITH A MINOR. (a) A 
custodian commits the offense of failure to permit visitation with a 
minor if he intentionally, and without just excuse, fails to permit 
visitation with a child under 18 years of age in his custody in sub­
stantial conformance with a court order that is specific as to when he 
must permit another to have visitation with that child. 
(b) The cust-0dian may not be charged under this section with more 
than one offense in respect to what is, under the court order, a single 
continuous period of visitation. 
(c) In a prosecution under this section, existing provisions of 
law prohibiting the disclosure of confidential communications between 
husband and wife do not apply, and both husband and wife are competent 
to testify for or against each other as to all relevant matters, if a 
court order has awarded custody to one spouse and visitation to the 
other. 
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(d) As used in this section, 
(1) "court order" means a de�ree, judgment, or order issued 
by a couit of competent jurisdiction; 
(2) "custod:ian" means a natural person who has been awarded 
custody, either temporary or permanent, of a chi]d under 18 years of 
age; 
(3) "just excuse" includes illness of the child which makes 
it dangerous to the health of the child for visitation to take place 1n 
conformance with the court order; "just excuse" does not include the 
wish of the child not to have visitation with the person entitled to it. 
(e) Failure to permit visitation with a minor is a violation. 
Sec. 11.51.130. CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A MINOR. (a) 
A person commits the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor 
if he knowingly aids, causes, or encourages a child under 18 years of 
age to do any act in fact prohibited by state law. 
(b) Contributing to the delinquency of a minor is a class A mis­
demeanor. 
Sec. 11.51.135. UNLAWFUL EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR. (a) A person 
commits the crime of unlawful exploitation of a minor if, in this state 
and with the intent of producing for any commercial purpose a live per­
formance, film, photograph, negative, slide, book, or magazine that 
depicts such conduct, he knowingly induces or employs a child under 18 
years of age to engage in, or photographs, films, or televises a child 
under 18 years of age engaged in, explicit sexual penetration, sexual 
contact, bestiality, or lewd exhibition of the child's genitals. 
(b) Unlawful exploitation of a minor is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11.51.140. UNLAWFUL HARRYING. (a) A person commits the 
crime of unlawful marrying if he knowingly marries or purports to marry 
(1) another person when he or the other person is lawfully 
59. 
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. (2) more than one person simultaneously; or 
(3) a person who simultaneously is marrying another person. 
(b) Unlawful rnarryicig is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.51.150. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER OF PEACE OFFICER TO 
LEAVE DWELLING. (a) A peace officer may, with or without a warrant, 
when he has reasonable grounds to believe that one member of a household 
has recently inflicted physical injury on another member of the same 
household, whether or not that physical injury _has occurred in his 
presence, 
(1) enter the dwelling and make reasonable inquiry of the 
person upon whom he believes physical injury has been recently in­
flicted, and of any other witnesses, to ascertain whether there is 
probable danger of further physical injury being inflicted upon that 
person by the other person; and 
(2) when he has reasonable grounds to believe that there is 
such probable danger, order either person to leave the dwelling for a 
cooling-off period of up to four hours. 
(b) A person who fails to comply with a reasonable order of a 
peace officer �nder (a) of this section or who returns to the dwelling 
before the expiration of the cooling-off period commits the crime of 
failure to comply with order of peace officer to leave dwelling. 
(c) This section does not limit the power of a peace officer to 
take any other action authorized by law. 
(d) A peace officer who orders a person to leave a dwelling under 
this section is not liable for civil damages as a result of his order. 
This subsection does not preclude liability for civil damages as a 
result of reckless, wilful, wanton, or intentional misconduct. 
(e) As used in this section, "household" means the social unit 
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comprised of those living together in the same dwelling. 
(f) Failure to comply with order of peace officer to leave dwellin 
is a class B misdemeanor. 
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CHAPTER 51. Offenses Against the Family 
cm1.�1ENTARY 
I. TD AS 11. 51.100-.120. ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A MINOR 
IN THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREES; CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT 
A. Existing Law 
Desertion, abandonment and refusal to support a 
spouse or a child under sixteen are prohibited in AS 11.35. 010. 
Punishment is set at imprisonment for up to one year and/or 
a maximum $500 fine. Additionally, several statutes outside 
of title 11 require doctors, teachers and others to report 
cases of child neglect and abuse the the Department of Realth 
and Social Services. See AS 47. 17. 
B. The Code Provision 
The subject of child neglect and abuse was one of 
the most debated, difficult and divisive topics considered by 
the Subcommission. The Subcommission agreed that the appli­
cation of the criminal law in this area was rarely appropriate. 
In certain instances, however, there may be no choice but to 
resort to criminal sanctions to protect the child or vindicate 
societal norms. The Code provides this alternative. 
In reviewing the Code provisions that follow, it 
must be remembered that the Code's general assault and criminal 
homicide provisions provide comprehensive coverage of conduct 
involvin9 physical abuse of children. The Code's endangering 
the welfare of a minor statutes merely supplement that coverage. 
If it can be established that the child suffered serious physical 
injury or was assaulted by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous 
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instrument, prosecution should be brought under the general 
assault provisions which are classified more seriously than 
the crimes discussed below. 
1. Endangering the Welfare of a Minor 
The Code provides for two degrees of the crime of 
endangering the welfare of a minor. The first degree provision, 
a class C felony, is committed when a person legally charged 
with the care or custody of a child less than ten intentionally 
deserts the child under circumstances creatin� a substantial 
risk of physical injury. 
Use of the term ''aeserts " requires that the defendant 
act with an intent to permanently sever his relationship with 
the child rather than to merely create a temporary physical 
separation. Not only must the defendant desert the child but 
he must do so under circumstances creating a substantial risk 
of physical injury to the child. See generally State v. Laemoa, 
533 P.2d 370, 375 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975) . The Code provision 
would not cover the parent who, for example, left the child 
in the custody of a relative for two days even though the 
parent had agreed to return in four hours. 
The first degree provision only applies to children 
less than ten. The criterion for the choice of the age of ten 
was at what age the child would, under the circumstances, be 
able to call his plight to the attention of others and to 
identify himself. 
Endangering the welfare of a minor in the second 
degree, a class B misdemeanor, can be violated by any person 
who has custody or control of a child less than 13. The 
63. 
babysitter who leaves a child unattended in a locked car 
during the dead of winter for any significant period would 
be subject to the statute in the same manner as the parent 
engaging in identical conduct. 
By providing that the statute can be violated by a 
defendant acting with the culpable mental state of "criminal 
negligence," the Code imposes a high standard of care. 
Liability is not dependent on a showing that the defendant 
was aware of the risk that his conduct would cause a result 
described in subsections (a) (1) -(a) (4) ; liability can be estab­
lished by a showing that failure to be aware of the risk con­
stituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe. Ordinary negligence, however, 
would not be sufficient to establish culpability. See 
Tentative Draft, Part 2, at 17-19. 
Subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) are new to existing 
law and proscribe conduct that might not otherwise be covered 
under the Code, i.e., chaining a child to a stove or smearing 
feces on the child's face. In these situations, there may be 
no physical injury to the child which would qualify the conduct 
as assault. Nevertheless, the emotional and psychological 
harm to the child may be substantial. 
Subsection (a) (4) parallels TD AS 11.51.210, Criminal 
nonsupport, discussed infra. The subsection differs from the 
nonsupport statute, however, since it does not require that the 
defendant be legally obligated to provide support. The aunt 
or neighbor, for example, having custody of the child at the 
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request of his vacationing parents will violate the statute 
by depriving the child of necessary food, clothing or shelter. 
2. Criminal Nonsupport 
The Code's criminal nonsupport statute, TD AS 
11.51.120, an A misdemeanor, is based on existing AS 11.35.010, 
Desertion or nonsupport of a spouse or child. 
from existing law should be noted. 
Several changes 
The Code provision only applies to the support of 
children; it does not apply to support of spouses. The increased 
availability of legal services and the variety of civil remedies 
available to deserted spouses militates against continued crim­
inal sanctions in this area. 
The Code provision raises the age of the child 
from 16, as it appears in AS 11.35.010, to 18. This change 
takes into account the longer period of time during which 
children are expected to remain in school and dependent on 
their parents. 
Like the existing statute, the Code provision makes 
liability dependent on the absence of a "lawful excuse. " Thus, 
a defendant may not be convicted under the statute for failure 
to provide support to his minor child if he is in fact finan­
cially unable to provide support and his poverty is not self­
induced. See Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1971) . 
The term " support" is defined in subsection (b) and is 
derived from existing AS 11.35.0l0 (b). 
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II. TD AS 11. 51. 125. FAILURE TO PERMIT VISITATION WITH A 
MINOR 
A. Existing Law 
Enacted in 1977, AS 11.36.010 provides that the 
custodian of a minor child who "wilfully and without just 
excuse " fails to permit visitation with the child in substan­
tial conformance with a court order specifying visitation 
rights is punishable by a $200 fine. 
B. The Code Provision 
Because AS 11. 36.010 was adopted by the legislature 
less than a year ago, it has been included in the Code virtually 
unchanged. TD AS 11.51. 125 does, however, use the term 
" intentionally" instead of " wilfully" to describe the culpable 
mental state requirement. Since the only punishment provided 
by AS 11.36.010 is a fine, the Code classifies the conduct 
as a violation, a noncriminal offense punishable by a fine 
not to exceed $300. 
III. TD AS 11. 51. 130. CONTRIBUTING TO TRE DELINQUENCY OF 
A MINOR 
A. Existing Law 
Existing law provides for two degrees of the crime 
of contributing to the delinquency of a child. As defined in 
AS 11. 40.150, a "delinquent child" is a person under 18 who 
meets at least one of 12 additional requirements, i.e., " is 
in danger of becoming or remaining a person who leads an idle, 
dissolute, lewd, or immoral life, " or " habitually wanders 
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about railroad yards or tracks." AS 11.40.150(5), (10). 
Existing AS ll. 40. 130(a) provides that it is a misde­
meanor to commit an act or omit to perform a duty, which 
"causes or tends to cause, encourage or contribute to the 
delinquency of a child under the age of 18 years. " AS ll.40.130(b) 
provides that it is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for 
between one and two years, to induce a child by "threat, command 
or persuasion .. . to perform an act or follow a course of 
conduct which would cause or manifestly tend to cause him to 
become or remain a delinquent. " 
The vagueness of the language used in AS 11. 40. 130 
to describe the conduct prohibited in conjunction with the 
defintiion of delinquent found in AS 11. 40.150 has rendered the 
existing statutes particularly susceptible to constitutional 
attack. See, Hanby v. State, 479 P. 2d 486 (Alaska 1972) 
( "phrases such as 'to cause any child to become a delinquent,' 
[and] 'leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life' 
cannot meet the strict standard of specificity required in a 
criminal statute affecting expression protected by the first 
amendment"). See also State v. Hodges, 457 P. 2d 491 (Or. 1969) 
(OR. REV. STAT. § 167.210 on which AS 11. 40. 130 based held 
unconstitutional). 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code provision on "contributing" provides that 
a per1:,on commits a class A misdemeanor if he "knowingly aids, 
causes, or encourages a child under 18 years of age to 
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do any act in fact prohibited by state law." Vagueness prob-
lems are diminished by providing that only an act of the 
defendant which " aids, causes or encourages" a minor to violate 
state law is prohibited. This conduct would not generally be 
punishable under the complicity provisions of the Code unless 
the defendant acted with an intent to "promote or facilitate 
the commission of the offense" and, in fact, solicitated or 
commanded commission of the offense or aided or abetted in the 
planning or commission of the offense. TD AS 11. 16.110(2) (A) , (B). 
Note that the defendant must know that the person 
is under the age of 18 years. Use of the phrase "in fact 
prohibited by state law, " however, clearly limits application 
of the culpable mental state of "knowing." Under TD AS 11. 51.130, 
it will be sufficient that the actor knows the person whom he 
encourages is less than 18; strict liability is imposed 
as to the circumstance that the act is prohibited by law. 
IV. TD AS 11.51.135. UNLAWFUL EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR 
Though this section is new to existing law, similar 
conduct has arguably been covered by the broad proscription 
of existing AS 11. 40.130, which imposes felony penalties on 
one who "by threats, command or persuasion endeavors to induce 
a child under the age of 18 years to perform an act . . . which 
would manifestly tend to cause him to become or remain a 
delinquent. " 
TD AS 11.51.135, a class C felony, provides that the 
crime of unlawful exploitation of a minor can be committed in 
either of two ways. The first requires that the defendant 
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induce or employ a person under 18 to engage in one of the 
specified forms of sexual conduct. The second covers the 
defendant who may not have induced the minor to engage in 
sexual conduct, but nevertheless filmed, te levised or photo­
graphed such conduct. 
Applicable to both forms of prohibited conduct are 
the requirements that the defendant's acts take place in this 
state, that he know the person whom he employs or ph'otographs 
is under 18, and that he act with the intent to produce, for 
a commercial purpose, any "live performance, film, photograph, 
negative, slide, book or magazine " that depicts the minor 
engaged in "explicit sexual penetration, sexual contact, bes­
tiality or lewd exhibition of that person's genitals." Compare 
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 263. 15 (M.cKinney Supp. 1977) discussed in 
St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 22 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2282 
(N. Y. Nov. 28, 1977) . 
Use of the term "explicit" in describing the prohibited 
forms of sexual conduct set out in the statute is intended to ex­
clude simulated sexual acts from coverage. The term " lewd exhibi­
tion" was included solely to insure that the statute would not 
apply to photographs taken for Jegitimate medical textbooks. 
See Anderson v. State, 562 P. 2d 351 (Alaska, 1977) (upholding 
AS 11.15.134, Lewd or lascivious acts toward children, against 
vagu�ness challenge: "phrase 'lewd or lascivious act ' is not 
to be judged on vagueness grounds in isolation from the rest 
of the statute) .  
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V. TD AS 11. 51.140. UNLAWFUL MARRYING 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.40. 050, Polygamy, currently punishes by imprison­
ment for between one and seven years, a person who "having a 
spouse, marries another. . or simultaneously or on the same 
day, marries more than one person. " That AS 11. 40. 050 incor­
porates the common law doctrine of strict liability as to the 
existence of a valid prior marriage is underscored by the 
statute that follows it. AS 11. 40.060 provides that an offense 
is not committed by persons legally divorced or by a person 
"whose spouse has been continuously absent for five consecutive 
years, and is not known by the person to be living and is 
believed by the person to be dead. " 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code substantially restates AS 11. 40.050 but 
makes several changes in existing law. The name of the crime 
h.as been changed to "unlawful marrying" since both the Code 
and existing law prohibit what is commonly thought of as 
bigamy as well as polygamy. 
Th.e Code provision also reflects the modern view 
that bigamy should not be treated as a strict liability offense. 
Thus, the Code imposes class A misdemeanor penalties only if 
it is established that the defendant acted knowingly as 
to each of the elements set out in the statute, i. e. , he must 
know that either he or his prospective spouse is already law­
fully married to another or that either he or the prospective 
spouse is marrying more than one person simultaneously. Note 
that unlike existing AS 11. 40.050, the Code imposes liability 
on both parties to the bigamous marriage, irrespective of which 
of th.em is already married, so long as they act knowingly. 
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VI. TD AS 11. 51. 150. FAILURE TO co_i·1PLY WITH ORDER OF PEACE 
OFFICER TO LCAVE DWELLING 
This Code provision is new to Alaska law. It is 
designed to provide increased protection for the person who 
is physically abused by another member of his household. Though 
drafted primarily to deal with the problem of spouse abuse, the 
coverage of the statute is much broader than that. It applies 
to all pers.ons living in the same household. The term " house­
hold" is defined in subsection (e) as " the social unit comprised 
of those living together." Thus, in addition to protecting 
spouses it would also apply, for example, to the mother-in-law 
who is assaulted by her son-in-law and the female who is beaten 
up by the male she is living with. 
The Code provision is necessary since most instances 
of physical abuse occurring in the household will be a misde­
meanor. A peace officer may only arrest for a misdemeanor if 
the assault takes place in his presence. AS 12.25.030. Forcing 
the abused woman to make a citizen ' s  arrest of her spouse, for 
example, provides an uncertain remedy that is more likely to 
occur in theory than in practice. 
TD AS 11. 51. 150 allows a peace officer who has 
reasonable grounds to believe that one member of a household 
has recently inflicted physical injury upon another member of 
the same household, to enter the dwelling with or without a 
warrant and make reasonable inquiry to determine whether there is 
probable danger of further physical harm. If he "has reason­
able grounds to believe that there is such probable danger, " 
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he may " order either person to leave the dwelling for a 
cooling-off period of up to four hours. " Failure to comply 
with a reas.onable order to leave the dwelling will constitute 
a class B misdemeanor. Subsection (d) provides immunity from 
civil l�ability to officers acting pursuant to the statute for 
conduct not amounting to gross negligence or intentional mis­
conduct. 
Subsection ( c) clarifies that the intent of the 
statute is not to limit the power of a peace officer to take any 
other action authorized by law. Thus, should it appear that a 
felony has been committed under the assault provisions of TD 
AS 11 . 41.200-. 220, the peace officer still retains the power 
to arrest for the felony under AS 12. 25. 030. 
72. 
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CHAPTER 56 . OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. 
ARTICLE 6. ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE . 
Section 
850 Official Misconduct 
860 Misuse of Confidential Information 
Sec . 11. 56.850 .  OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT. (a) A public servant com­
mits the crime of official misconduct if , with intent to obtain a 
benefit or to injure or deprive another person of a benefit , he 
(1) cormnits an act relating to his office but cons titut ing 
an unauthorized exercise of his official functions , knowing that tha� 
act is unauthorized; or 
(2) knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is 
imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his 
office. 
(b) Official misconduct is a class 
Sec. 11. 56 .  860 . MISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. (a) A person 
who is or has been a public servant commits the crime of misuse of 
confidential information if he 
(1) learns confidential information through his employment; 
and 
(2) while in office or after leaving office, uses the con­
fidential information for personal gain or in a manner not connected 
with the performance of his official duties other than by giving sworn 
testimony or evidence in a legal proceeding in conformity with a court 
order . 
(b) As used in this section, "confidential informat ion" means 
information which has been classified confidential by law. 
(c) Misuse of confidential information is a class 
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ALASY-A REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 56. Offenses Against Public Administration 
ARTICLE 6. ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 
COMMEHTARY 
I .  TD AS 11.56.850. OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.30.230, " Receiving unauthorized fees; 
nonfeasance in office" applies to an officer of the state, 
borough, city or other municipal or public corporation, 
other than the governor or judge of the supreme court. The 
statute prohibits three acts : (1) charging an unauthorized 
fee for official services; (2) wilfully neglecting or refusing 
to perform a duty or service with intent to injure or defraud; 
or (3) wilfully neglecting or refusing to perform a duty or 
service to the injury of another, or to the manifest hindrance 
or obstruction of public justice or business, whether i ntended 
or not. Punishment is set at three months to one year in j ail, 
or $50 - $500 fine and/or dismissal from office. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code provision on official misconduct applies to 
all "public servants." A definition and discussion of that 
term appears in Tentative Draft, Part 2, at 87, 89-93. To 
commit the offense, a class A misdemeanor, the public servant must 
act with an intent to obtain a benefit (defined and discussed 
in Tentative Draft, Part 2, at 87-79) or to injure or deprive 
another person of a benefit. Mere negligent behavior, or 
awareness that a person is being inj ured or deprived of a 
74. 
benefit will not establish the requisite culpability. The 
statute covers acts of both malfeasance and nonfeasance. The 
public servant must act or refrain from acting with a conscious 
objective to obtain a benefit or to injure or deprive another 
person of a benefit. Acting with the requisite intent, the 
public servant can violate the statute in one of two ways. 
Subsection (1) applies to acts constituting a knowing 
unauthorized exercise of the public servant's function. 
For example, a court clerk may be on notice that 
papers in a pending action were ordered "sealed," 
subject to inspection only upon a further court 
order. If such clerk, with intent to benefit a 
certain party, knowingly displays the "sealed" 
papers to such party without the requisite court 
order, he would be guilty of official misconduct 
as defined in subdivision 1, i.e., he committed 
an act relating to his office but such act con­
stituted an unauthorized exercise of his official 
functions. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 195.00, Commentary at 386 (1975). 
Under subsection (2) the crime may be cormnitted by the 
public servant knowingly refraining from performing a duty. 
Subsection (2) requires knowledge both of the duty and that it 
is imposed by law or clearly inherent in the nature of the 
office. For example, an employment security clerk administering 
workmen's compensation who fails to certify eligibility of 
a person he knows is eligible because the person was rude to 
him or for some other private reason would be guilty of this 
offense. 
II. TD AS 11. 56. 860. .½ISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
A. Existing Law 
AS 39.51.010, enacted in 1975, provides as follows: 
75. 
A person who is or has been an employee of any 
state or local agency which keeps or has acL'f'�s to 
confidential information and through his employment 
learns confidential information and who, while in 
office or after Jeav.i.ng office, uses the 1.nforn1aL1u11 
for personal gain or in a manner not connected wi tli 
the performance of his official duties other than 
giving sworn testimony or evidence in a legal pro­
ceeding, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon convic­
tion is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
one year, or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by 
both. As used in this section "confidential informa­
tion" means information which has been classified 
confidential by law. 
B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 11.56.860 restates existing AS 37.51.010 but 
applies to all public servants, not just "employees of any 
state or local agency which keeps or has access to confidential 
information." If disclosure of confidential information occurs 
in sworn testimony in a legal proceeding it must be in con­
formity with a court order. By requiring a court order be 
obtained prior to disclosure, the Code makes it less likely 
that the statute will be circumvented in private litigation 
where the person whose privacy interests are at stake may not be 
represented. Nothing in the Code provision prohibits the public 
servant from disclosing "confidential information'' in the court 
proceeding so long as his disclosure is in conformity with a 
court order. 
It is important to note that Alaska law is very strict 
in defining what is "confidential" information; unless the 
information is classified pursuant to a specific statute it 
can never be "confidential." Thus, the Code provision does 
not give rise to the same kind of issues which have arisen, 
76. 
for example, when recent federal legislation has been 
challenged as inhibiting public disclosure of governmental 
misconduct or shielding documents which had been classified 
"secret" by a bureaucrat acting on his own concept of what 
is "confidential." 
77. 
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CHAPTER 61. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER. 
ARTICLE 1. RIOT, DISORDERLY CONDUCT,, AND RELATED OFFENSES. 
Section 
100 Riot 
110 Disorderly Conduct 
120 Harassment 
130 Abuse of a Corpse 
140 Cruelty to Animals 
150 Obstruction of Highways 
Sec. 11.61.100. RIOT. (a) A person commits the crime of riot if, 
while participating with five or more persons, he engages in tumultuous 
and violent conduct in a public place and thereby recklessly causes, or 
creates a substantial risk of imminently causing, damage to property or 
physical injury to a person. 
(b) Riot is a class C felony, 
Sec. 11.61.110. DISORDERLY CONDUCT. (a) A person commits the 
crime of disorderly conduct if, 
(1) with intent to disturb the peace and privacy of another 
not physically on the same premises or with reckless disregard that his 
conduct is having that effect after being informed that it is having 
that effect, he makes unreasonably loud noise; 
(2) in a public place or in a private place of another with­
out consent, and with intent to disturb the peace and privacy of another 
or with reckless disregard that his conduct is having that effect after 
being informed that it is having that effect, he makes unreasonably loud 
noise; 
(3) in a public place, when a crime has occurred, he refuses 
to comply with a lawful order of a peace officer to disperse; 
(4) in a private place, he refuses to comply with an 
LA- L 20A 78. 
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order of a peace officer to leave premises in which he has neither a 
right of possession nor the express invitation to remain of a person 
having a right of possession; 
(5) in a public or private place, he challenges another to 
fight or engages in fighting other than in self-defense; or 
(6) he recklessly creates a hazardous condition for others by 
an act which has no legal justification or excuse. 
(b) As used in this section, "unreasonably loud noise" means noise 
which constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable person would follow in the same situation as the defedant, 
considering the nature and purpose of the conduct of the defendant and 
the circumstances known to him, including the nature of the location and 
the time of day or night. 
(c) Disorderly conduct is a class B misdemeanor and is punishable 
as authorized in ch. 36 of this title except that a sentence of impri­
sonment, if imposed, shall be for a definite term of not more than 10 
days. 
Sec. 11.61.120. HARASSMENT. (a) A person commits the crime of 
harassment if, with intent to harass or annoy another person, he 
(1) insults, taunts, or challenges another person in a manner 
likely to provoke an immediate violent response. 
(2) telephones another and fails to terminate the connection 
with intent to impair the ability of that person to place or receive 
telephone calls; or 
(3) makes repeated telephone calls anonymously, at extremely 
inconvenient hours, in obscene language, or that threaten physical 
injury; 
(b) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.61.130. ABUSE OF A CORPSE. (a) A person commits the 
79. 
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crime of abuse of a corpse i(, except as authorized by law, he inten­
tionally disinters, removes, conceals, �utilates, or engages in sexual 
penetration of a corpse. 
(b) Abuse of a corpse is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.61.lLfO. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS. (a) A person commits the 
crime of cruelty to animals if, except as authorized by alw, he 
(1) intentionally influcts severe and prolonged physical pain 
or suffering on an animal; 
(2) owns, possesses, keeps, or trains an animal with intent 
that it be engaged in an exhibition of fighting; or 
· (3) ·instigates, promotes, attends or has a pecuniary interest 
in an exhibition of fighting animals. 
(b) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the 
conduct of the defendant 
(1) conformed to accepted veterinary practice; 
(2) was part of scientific research governed by accepted 
standards; or 
(3) was necessarily incident to lawful hunting or trapping 
activities. 
(c) The defendant has the burden of injecting the issue of a 
defense under (b) -0f this section. 
(d) As used in this section, 11animal II means a vertebrate living 
creature not a human being, but does not include fish. 
(e) Cruelty to animals is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 61.150. OBSTRUCTION Of HIGHWAYS. (a) A person commits 
the crime of obstruction of highways if he 
(1) places, drops, or permits to drop on a highway any sub­
stance that creates a substanital risk of physical injury to others 
using the highway; or 
80. 
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(2) recklessly renders a highway impassable or passable only 
with unreasonable inconvenience or hazard. 
(b) Obstruction of highways under (a)(l) of this section is an 
offense of strict liability. 
(c) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under (a)(l) of 
this section that 
(1) the defendant took reasonable steps to remove the sub­
stance from the highway; and 
(2) no person suffered physical injury as a result of the 
presence of the substance on the highway. 
(d) Obstruction of highways is a class B misdemeanor, 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 61. Offenses Against Public Order 
ARTICLE 1. RIOT, D ISORDERLY CONDUCT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11.61.100. RIOT 
A. Existing Law 
At common law, thP. offense of riot required a 
tumultuous disturbance of the peace. AS 11.45.020 differs 
substantially from the common law definition by defining "riot" 
to mean the unlawful "use of force or violence, or threat to 
use force or violence, if accompanied by immediate power of 
execution, by three or more persons acting together." The 
statute is broad enough to cover three persons who are committing 
a robbery. AS 11.45.010 punishes one who engages in a riot 
(1) as a principal in any crime committed during the riot; (2) by 
fifteen years imprisonment if the person was disguised, carried 
a "species of dangerous weapon," or solicited acts of force; 
or ( 3) by from three months to one year imprisonment or by a 
$50-$500 fine in "all other cases. " 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code adopts the modern approach to riot 
by shifting the emphasis of the crime from the commission of 
other crimes by rioters, to "tumultuous and violent conduct 
in a public place" that "recklessly causes, or creates a 
substantial risk of causing damage to property or physical 
injury to a person." 
Riot is classified as a C felony. Rioters who engage 
82. 
in specific �orms of criminal conduct during the course of a 
riot will additionally be subject to prosecution under 
statutes describing specific offenses. 
The statute requires that the rioter act recklessly; 
he must be aware of and consciously disregard a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that his conduct is causing or is 
creating a substantial risk of causing property damage or 
physical injury. The requirement that the risk be "of such 
a· nature and degree that disregard of it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person 
would observe" is intended to insure that the statute will not 
apply to trivial injury to property such as walking on seeded 
grass adjacent to a sidewalk. See TD AS ll. ll.140 (a) ( 3) 
(definition of "recklessly"). 
Unlike existing law, the Code requires that the conduct 
occur in a "public place, " (defined at TD AS 11.88.100( ) see 
commentary accompanying TD AS 11.71.110) and that the defendant 
participate with five other persons. The public place requirement 
follows from the shift in focus to conduct likely to cause public 
alarm. The increased nur�er of participants necessary for con-
viction reflects the Subcon�ission's determination as to how 
many rioters could create substantial enforcement problems for 
a mobile force. 
In accordance with recent Alaska Supreme Court 
decisions emphasizing the importance of safeguarding the 
exercise of constitutional rights (see, e. g. ,  Poole v. State, 
524 P. 2d 286 (1974) ; Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P. 2d 644 
(1972)) , TD AS 11.61.100 requires that the rioter's conduct 
83. 
be tumultuous and violent. This element precludes application 
of the statute to persons exercising constitutionally protected 
rights of speech and assembly. Behavior th�t is �erely tumul­
tuous will be insufficient to sustain a conviction under the 
statute. 
II. TD AS 11.61.1 10. DISORDERLY CONDUCT 
A. Existing Law 
In Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644 (Alaska 
1972) the Alaska Supreme Court overturned Anchorage's municipal 
disorderly conduct ordinance on the ground that, on its face, 
the ordinance purported to reach speech engaged in "to the 
annoyance and disturbance of others. " Two years later, in 
Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 286 (Alaska 1974) , the court invali­
dated a similar state disorderly conduct statute. 
The existing disorderly conduct statute, AS 11.4�. uJ0, 
was adopted following the Marks and Poole decisions. The 
statute, in part, prohibits shouting and other "loud noises" 
made with "reckless disregard for the peace and privacy of 
others. " 
In the most recent test of AS 1 1.45.030, the state 
conceded error in the arrest and conviction of a person charged 
with shouting in an Anchorage bar. The state urged the court, 
however, to uphold the constitutionality of AS ll.45.030 (a) (1) 
by reading in the limitation that loud noises in public places 
are prohibited only if they are made with an "intent to invade 
and disturb . . .  [the] peace and privacy" of others, and if 
they are, in fact, "grossly incompatible with and actually 
84. 
disruptive of the general activities " of others. When the 
"loud noise" is speech, the state formulation would additionally 
require that the actor's "communicative intent" be negligible. 
See Brief for Appellee at 21, Fuselier v. State, No. 323 3  
(Alaska, filed September 19, 1977) . 
B. The Code Provision 
Disorderly conduct is a class B misdemeanor carrying 
a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 days. The Code provision 
substantially restates existing AS 11.45.030 but is designed to 
avoid constitutional problems that have arisen under subsection 
( a) ( l) of that statute. 
1. Subsections (a) (1) , (a) (2) and "unreasonably 
loud noise " 
Subsections (a) (l) and (a) (2) replace existing .AS 11. 
45. 0 30 (a) (1) . Subsection (a) (1) is directed primarily at 
noisemaking within the con fines of one's home or on private 
property of another with that person's consent. By requiring 
that the victim not be "physically on the same premises, " the 
Code recognizes the privacy right of persons to act as they 
wish within their home so long as such conduct does. not infringe 
upon otheis beyond the home� I' 
Under subsection (a) (1) , a person acting with an intent 
to disturb the peace and privacy of another not physically on 
the same premises need not be shown to have actually disturbed 
that P'=rson so long as he creates "unreasonably loud noise. " 
The subsection also covers, for example, the boisterous private 
party when the party-goers are aware of and disregard a sub­
stantial and unjustifiable risk that they are disturbing the 
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peace and privacy of neighbors. The Code guards against 
vagueness and uneven enforcement in this situation by requir ing 
that the defendant be warned that his conduct is disturbing 
others and that he continue his conduct before the offense 
is committed. 
Subsection (a) (2) parallels (a) (1) but does not 
include-the requirement that the person disturbed be on separate 
premises if the actor himself is in a public place or on 
private property of another withou� the owner's consent. 
In Marks, supra at 663, the court noted that the 
phrase " unreasonable noise" without more might be considerer!. 
"indefinite." Subsection (b) both clarifies the meaning of 
"unreasonably loud" and insures that free speech will not be 
infringed upon by requiring that noisemaking constitute 
a "gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable 
person would follow in the same situation. " The intent of the 
Subcommission is clear: the legitimate exercise of first 
amendment rights can never constitute disorderly conduct. 
The phrase "peace and privacy" is also intended to 
take into account the varying nature of circumstances surround­
ing conduct. Persons attending a sporting event or peace 
officers, for example, would have a lower expectation of 
peace and privacy than a person attending a poetry reading or 
the ordinary citizen. C. f. Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d 1012, 
1015 n.5 (Alaska 1971) discussed infra. 
86. 
2. Subsections (a) (3) , (a) (4) , (a) (5) and (a) (6) 
The remaining subsections of the proposed statute 
are taken from existing AS 11.45.030. Subsection 
(a) ( 3) which punishes a refusal to disperse in a public place 
when a crime has occurred has been upheld against a claim of 
unconstitutionality. State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316 (Alaska 
1975) . Subsection (a) (5) encompasses unlawful fighting, and 
challenging another to fight. Though such a challenge is in 
fact a communication, it generally falls beyond the pale 
of protected speech since it constitutes an incitement to a 
breach of the peace. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568 (1942) . 
Subsection (a) (6) prohibits the reckless creation of 
"a hazardous condition for others by an act which has no legal 
justification or excuse." Examples of conduct covered under 
this provision would include turning off the lights or shouting 
"fire" in a crowded public auditorium. 
III. TD AS 11.61.120. HARASSMENT 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.45. 035, Illegal use of telephones, currently 
punishes by imprisonment for between three months and one year 
and/or by $1000 fine, a person who "anonymously telephones 
another person repeatedly for the purpose of annoying, molesting, 
abusing, through vile and obscene language or harassing that 
person or his family." 
87. 
B. The Code Provision 
The crime of harassment, a class B misdemeanor, 
can be committed in any of three ways, each of which requires 
that the defendant act with an " intent to harass or annoy 
another person." The terms "harass" and "annoy" have, in 
other contexts, been subject to strict constitutional scrutiny 
when used to describe results. See, Poole v. State, 524 P.2d 
286 (Alaska 1974) ; Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644 
(Alaska 1972) (since conduct which disturbs or annoys one 
person might not annoy another, "men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at [the ordinance's] meaning'{). The 
Code, however, uses these terms not to describe a result of 
conduct which might vary with the "ideological vicissitudes" of 
the victim, but rather to describe the specific intent with 
which the defendant must act. See Anniskette v. State, 489 
P.2d 1012, 1015 (Alaska 1971). 
Subsection (a) (1) prohibits insulting, taunting, or 
challenging another in a manner likely to provoke an immediate 
and violent response. Directed principally at preserving the 
public peace, the provision will penalize speech only when it 
falls within the unprotected "fighting words" category. See 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
Subsection (a) (2) covers another form of harassing 
conduct in which a call may be placed, and the line held open 
indefinitely after the call is answered. 
Subsection ( a) ( 3) substantially restates AS 11. 4 5. 0 3 5 
but closes a gap in existing law by not requiring that all 
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calls be made anonymously. See Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d 
1012 (Alaska 1971) . Repeated obscene calls, for example, will 
be covered even if the caller identifies himself. Subsection 
(a) (3) also expands existing law by encompassing repeated 
calls that threaten physical injury. If it can be established 
that the caller placed the person in fear of imminent physical 
injury he may be prosecuted for a single phone call under the 
Code's general assault provisions. TD AS 1 1.41.230(4). 
IV. TD AS 11. 61.130. ABUSE OF A CORPSE 
A. Existing Law 
AS 1 1. 40.440 provides a maximum two year sentence 
for disinterring, digging up, removing or conveying away a 
human body or its remains. A second statute proscribes the 
detaining of a body for a debt and makes such conduct punish­
able by imprisonment for up to six months and/or a $500 fine. 
AS 1 1.40.450. 
B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 1 1.61.130 provides that a person commits the 
crime of Abuse of a corpse, a class A misdemeanor, if he 
intentionally "disinters, removes, conceals, mutilates or 
engages in sexual penetration of a corpse." By including 
mutilation and sexual penetration within the ambit of the 
statute, the Code recognizes that such conduct may outrage 
family sensibilities as much as an actual unlawful taking of 
the corpse. Note, however, that the phrase "except as author­
ized by law" exempts from coverage of the statute the legitimate 
89. 
activities of persons such as coroners, physicians and 
morticians. 
The existing offense of Attaching or detaining dead 
body for debt, AS 11. 40.450, is not retained in the Code. 
While such conduct may be offensive, the Subcommission felt 
that existing civil remedies were adequate. See Edwards v. 
Franke, 364 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1961); AS 08.42.090(6) (mortician's 
license may be revoked for failure to promptly surrender 
custody of corpse on order of person lawfully entitled to 
custody). 
V. TD AS 11. 61.140. CRUELTY TO ANIThLS 
A. Existing Law 
Cruelty to animals is currently regulated by nine 
statutes in Title 11: AS 11.40.480, Cruelty to animals; 
AS 11.40.490, Penalties for cruelty to domestic animals; 
AS 11. 40.500, Abandoning disabled animals to die; AS 11.40.510, 
Use of live birds as targets; AS 11.40.520, Fighting or baiting 
animals or creatures and related offenses; AS 11.40.530, 
Maintaining kennel or pet shop in unsanitary or inhumane 
manner; AS 11.40.540, Humane and scientific uses excepted; 
and AS 11.40.550, Legal impounding and extermination of animals 
excepted. Misdemeanor penalties ranging from a fine of "not 
more than $50" (AS 11.40.530) to imprisonment for up to six 
months plus a fine of $500 (AS 11.40.520) are authorized for 
these of�enses. More stringent penalties of imprisonment for 
one year and a fine of $3,000 are authorized for one who 
90. 
"naliciously or wantonly kills, wounds, disfigures or injures 
any animal which is the property of another ... or maliciously 
exposes poison with the intent that it be taken by any animal.'' 
AS 11.20. 520, Malicious or wanton injury to animals. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code consolidates the many provisions of 
existing law into a single statute which classifies as an A 
misdemeanor, the intentional infliction of ''severe and pro­
longed physical pain or suffering on any animal.'' TD AS 
ll. 61.140 (a) (1) . TD AS ll.61.140 (d) expressly defines the 
term "animal" to exclude human beings, fish and other non-
vertebrates. If the animal is simply killed without the 
consent of the owner, such conduct will constitute criminal 
mischief. TD AS 11.46. 482-.486. 
Subsection (b) provides that it is a defense to 
prosecution under (a) (1) that the defendant's conduct conformed 
to generally accepted veterinary practice or was part of 
scientific research governed by accepted standards. The addi­
tional granting of the defense when defendant's conduct is 
necessarily incident to lawful hunting or trapping activities 
avoids unnecessary overlap and potential conflict with rules 
and regulations established by the Board of Fish and Game 
pursuant to AS 16.05.250. 
Subsection (a) (2) substantially restates existing 
AS 11.40. 520, Fighting or baiting animals or creatures and 
related offenses. Under this provision, as under existing 
law, _persons who attend exhibitions of fighting animals are 
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held to be equally as culpable as persons who organize such 
conduct. 
VI. TD AS 11.61.150. OBSTRUCTION OF HIGHWAYS 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.20.590, Injury to highways, public recreation 
facilities, or highway signs, currently punishes by imprison­
ment for up to one year and/or a $500 fine, a person who 
"darnagefs] , destroy[s] or intending to prevent free use of it 
by the public, obstruct[s] a highway." Similar sanctions are 
imposed on a person who "build[s] or place[s] a barbed wire 
fence across any well traveled trail" which has been in common 
use for over a year unless he places "on the outside of the 
top tier of the barbed wire on the fence a board, pole, or 
other suitable protection which is at least 16 feet in length. " 
A separate statute outside title 11 imposes misdemeanor penalties 
on a person who "purposely obstruct[s] or block [s] traffic on 
any roadway." AS 28.35. 140, Unlawful obstruction or blocking 
of traffic. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code recognizes that obstruction of highways, 
a class B misdemeanor, may take place in either of two ways. 
The first, described in subsection (a) (1) , imposes strict 
liability for allowing dangerous materials to be left on a 
highway. This provision would cover, for example, the person haul­
ing rubbish to a dump when part of his load slides off into the 
road and creates a substantial risk of physical injury to sub-
sequent highway users. Subsection (c), however, would grant 
92. 
the person an affirmative defense if he can establish that he 
took immediate steps to rectify the situation and that, in 
fact, no one was injured. The broad definition of "highway" 
set forth in the Commentary accompanying TD AS 11.71.110 
would also allow liability to be imposed upon a person who, 
for example, leaves material on a sidewalk staircase under 
circumstances in which a passerby might slip on the material 
and suffer physical injury. 
Subsection (a) (2) of the proposed statute, however, 
requires that the defendant have been at least reckless as 
to whether his conduct impeded highway travel. Thus, one who 
parks his car in the middle of a busy road in order to watch 
salmon spawning in a nearby stream would violate TD AS 
11. 61. 150 (a) (2) if he is "aware of but disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct will result in making 
the road "impassable, or passable only with unreasonable 
inconvenience or hazard." 
93. 
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CHAPTER 61. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER. 
ARTICLE_ 2.". OFFENSES AGAINST PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION. 
Section 
200 Eavesdropping 
210 Interception of Private Correspondence 
220 Unauthorized Divulgence or Use of Communications 
230 Exemptions 
240 Definitions 
Sec. 11. 61. 200. EAVESDROPPING. (a) A person corrnnits the crime of 
eavesdropping if, with intent to hear or record all or part of an oral 
conversation, he uses an eavesdropping device without the consent of a 
party to the conversation. 
(b) Eavesdropping is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 61. 210. INTERCEPTION OF PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of interception of private correspondence if, 
without consent of the sender or intended recipient, he intentionally 
(1) intercepts, opens, or reads private correspondence; or 
(2) destroys or detains private correspondence to delay or 
prevent reception by the person entitled to it. 
(b) Interception of private correspondence is a class A misde-
meanor. 
Sec. 11.61.220. UNAUTHORIZED DIVULGENCE OR USE OF COMMUNICATIONS. 
(a) A person commits the crime of unauthorized divulgence or use of 
communications if he knowingly divulges or uses for his own or another's 
benefit any information concerning a communication 
(1) with reckless disregard that the information was obtained 
in violation of sec. 200 or 210 of this chapter; or 
(2) to which he has access as an employee or officer of the 
communications common carrier transmitting the communication. 
LA- L 20A 94. 
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(b) The provisions of (a)(2) of this section do not apply to 
divulgence through authorized channels of transmission or reception to 
(1) the intended recipient or his agent; 
(2) a person employed or authorized to forward a corranunica­
tion to its destination; 
(3) proper accounting or distributing officers of communi­
cation centers over which the communication may be passed; 
(4) the master of a ship under whom the employee or officer 
is serving; 
(S) another on demand of lawful authority; 
(6) in response to a subpoena issued by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
(c) Unauthorized divulgence or use of communications is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 61.230. EXEMPTIONS. Sections 210 and 220 of this chapter 
do not apply to 
(1) listening to radio or wireless communications of any sort 
when the same are .publicly made; 
(2) hearing a corranunication when heard by an employee or 
officer of a communications common carrier incidental to the normal 
course of his employment in the operation, maintenance, or repair of the 
equipment of the corranon carrier, if information concerning the communi­
cation is not used or divulged in any manner by the hearer; 
(3) a broadcast by radio or other means whether it is a live 
broadcast or recorded for the purpose of later broadcasts of any func­
tion where the public is in attendance and the conversations which are 
overheard are incidental to th� main purpose for which the broadcast is 
then being made; or 
(4) recording or.listening with the aid of any device to an 
95. 
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emergency oral conversation made in the normal course of operations by 
an organization which deals with emerge�cies involving danger to life or  
property. 
Sec . 11. 61. 240. DEFINITIONS. As used in secs .  200 - 240 of  this 
chapter, unless the context requires otherwise, 
(1) "communication" means an oral convers ation or private 
correspondence; 
(2) "eavesdropping device" means a device capable of being 
used to hear or record oral conversations but does not include devices 
used for the restoration of the deaf or hard of hearing to normal or 
partial hearing; 
(3) "information concerning a communication" means the exi s ­
tence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning o f  a communic a­
tion; 
(4) "intercept" means to acquire the contents of a communi-
cation and includes the acquisition of the contents by simultaneous 
transmis sion or recording; 
(5) "oral conversation" means a communication by speech, 
whether conducted in person, by telephone, or by any other means; 
(6) "private correspondence" means a corrnnunication other than 
by speech, including but not limited to telegraph mes sages and sealed 
letters, sent 
(A) by a person exhibiting an expectation that the 
communication is not subject to being intercepted, opened, or read 
other than by its intended recipient or an employee or officer of a 
communications common carrier acting in the usual course of busi­
ness; and 
(B) under circumstances reasonably j ustifying that 
expectation. 
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ALASKA REVISBD CRPU�JAL CODE 
CHAPTER 61. Offenses Against Public Order 
ARTICLE 2. OFFENSES AGAINST PRIVACY OF CO�UNICATION 
co:."1.MENTARY 
A. Existing Law 
Privacy of communications is subject to considerable 
protection in existing law. See, e.g., AS 11.20.660,  Opening 
or publishing contents of sealed letters ; AS 11.60.280, Unauthor­
ized publication or use of communications; AS 11.60. 290, 
Eavesdropping; AS 42.20.090, Punishment and civil liability 
for opening or obtaining message addressed to another; AS 42. 
20.070, Punishment and civil liability for use by employee of 
information derived from message . While existing statutes 
vary, in that they prohibit separate and specific ways o f  inter­
fering with communications, they are similar in that each 
generally contains extensive language that prohibits the divulgence 
or use of information by one who obtains it unlawfully or in 
the course of an authorized transmission. Most statutes describe 
misdemeanor offenses punishable by fine and/or a maximum term 
of imprisonment of one year. See, �.g., AS 11.60. 280. But 
see AS 42.20. 890 (civil damages in addition to misdemeanor 
penalties) ; AS 42.20.070 (treble damages in addition to misde­
meanor penalties) . 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code continues the coverage of existing 
law by consolidating into three proposed statutes the scattered 
97. 
provisions that currently proscribe instrusions upon the 
privacy of communications. The first two statutes prohibit 
unlawful interception of messages while the third punishes 
divulgence of information obtained unlawfully or in the course 
of an authorized transmission. A comparison of the Code's 
article with existing law follows. 
1. TD AS 11.61.200. EAVESDROPPING 
The Code provision, classified as an A misdemeanor, 
substantially restates existing AS 11.6 0.290 (1) which prohibits 
the use of an eavesdropping device to overhear or record oral 
conversations . Note that conduct covered by AS 11 . 60.290 (2) -(4), 
relating to divulgence or use of information obtained through 
eavesdropping, is now covered under TD AS 11.61.220, Unauthorized 
divulgence or use of communications . 
2. TD AS 11.61. 210. INTERCEPTION OF PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 
Conduct now prohibited by existing AS 11.20.660 and 
AS 42.20. 090 includes opening, reading, or detaining sealed 
letters and telegraph messages. The Code consolidates these 
statutes by including sealed letters, telegraph messages and 
other nonverbal communications within the definition of "private 
correspondence. " TD AS 11. 61. 210 authorizes imposition of 
A misdemeanor penalties on a person who intentionally and 
without consent of either the sender or intended recipient, 
"intercepts, opens or reads private correspondence " or who 
"destroys or detains ... [it] to delay or prevent reception 
by the person entitled to it." Note that while the definition 
of "private correspondence " covers all nonverbal communications, 
98. 
the communications must have been sent by a person expecting 
privacy and "under circumstances reasonably justifying that 
expectation." TD AS 11. 61. 240 (6). 
As with the proposed eavesdropping statute, TD AS 
11.61.200, conduct covered by existing prohibitions relating 
to divulgence or use of unlawfully obtained , information is 
covered under TD AS 11.61.220, Unauthorized divulgence or use 
of communications. 
3. TD AS 11.61.220. UNAUTHORIZED DIVULGENCE OR USE OF 
COM�UNICATIONS 
�his provision effects a major consolidation of the 
various provisions on using and divulging information that 
accompany each separate existing statute that prohibits the un­
lawful obtaining of messages and communications. Classified 
as an A misdemeanor, the Code provision parallels existing 
AS 11.60.280, Unauthorized publication or use of communications, 
and applies as well to the unauthorized use or divulgence 
of information obtained by persons through their employment 
with communications common carriers. 
Note that a person who becomes acquainted with infor­
mation contained in a communication but is not at least reckless 
as to the lack of consent of the parties to it incurs no 
liability for using or divulging the information unless he is 
the employee or agent of a communications common carrier. 
Similar conduct is currently subj ect to misdemeanor penalties 
under subsection (c) and (e) of existing AS 11.60.280. Note 
also that the proposed statutes contain no reference to civil 
9 9. 
damages. The Subcommission felt that in most cases, actual 
damages would be nominal and that a specific reference to 
treble damages might be interpreted as foreclosing the possi­
bility of an award of punitive damages in appropriate cases. 
See also Commentary accompanying TD AS 11.06.120. 
4. TD AS 11 . 61.230. EXEMPT IONS 
Th.is section substantially restates AS 11.60. 300. 
The phrase "organization which deals with . . . emergencies 
involving danger to life or property, "  used in TD AS 11.41. 4 80, 
Criminal mischief in the first degree, has been substituted 
for the existing list of such organizations . Subsection (5) 
of AS 11.60.300 previously exempted "inadvertent interception 
of telephone conversations over party lines. " This provision 
has been omitted as unnecessary since this. form of interception 
would not violate the proposed eavesdropping statute unless 
engaged in with an "intent to hear or record all or part o f  
an oral conversation." 
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CHAPTER 71. WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES. 
Section 
100 Misconduct Involving Weapons in t.hc First Degree 
110 Misconduct Involving Weapons in the Second Degree 
120 Misconduct Involving Weapons in the Third Degree 
130 Possession of Burglary Tools 
140 Criminal Possession of Explosives 
150 Unlawful Furnishing of Explosives 
160 Definitions 
Sec. 11.71.100. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS IN THE FIRST DEGREE. 
(a) A person commits the crime of misconduct involving weapons in the 
first degree if he 
(1) possesses a firearm capable of being concealed on his 
person after having been convicted inside or outside this state of a 
felony involving violence; 
(2) knowingly sells or transfers a firearm capable of being 
concealed on one's person to a person who has been convicted inside or 
outside this state of a felony involving violence; or 
(3) manufactures, possesses, transports, sells, or transfers 
a prohibited weapon. 
(b) The provisions of (a)(l) and (2) �f this section do not apply 
if 
(1) the person convicted of the prior offense on which the 
action is based received a pardon for that conviction; or 
(2) a period of five years or more, excluding any periods of 
incarceration, has elapsed between the date of conviction of the prior 
offense on which the action is based and the date of the possession, 
sale, or transfer of the firearm. 
(c) The provisions of (a)(3) of this section do not apply if the 
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manufacture, possession, transportation, sale, or transfer of the pro­
hibited weapon is in accordance with re�istration under the National 
Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. sec. 5801 et seq.). 
(d) Misconduct involving weapons in the first degree is a class C 
felony. 
Sec. 11.71.110. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
(a) A person commjts the crime of misconduct involving weapons in the 
second degree if he 
(1) possesses on his person a deadly weapon while his physi­
cal or mental condition is substantially impaired as a result of the 
introduction of an intoxicating liquor or a drug into his body; 
(2) sells or transfers a deadly weapon to a person knowing 
that the physical or mental condition of that person is substantially 
impaired as a result of the introduction of an intoxicating liquor or a 
drug into his body; 
(3) intentionally defaces a firearm or knowingly possesses a 
firearm that has been intentionally defaced; 
(4) discharges a firearm on, along, or across a highway; or 
(5) flourishes, points, or discharges a firearm in a city of 
any class or in or at a public place. 
(b) The provisions of (a) (5) of this section do not apply to 
flourishing, pointing, or discharging a firearm in a shooting range, 
shooting event, hunting area, or similar location or activity when that 
conduct is specifically authorized hy law. 
(c) Misconduct involving weapons in the second degree is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 71.120. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS IN Tl!E THIRD DEGREE. 
(a) A person commits the crime of misconduct involving weapons in the 
third degree if he 
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(1) knowingly possesses a deadly weapon concealed on his 
person or concealed in any place about his person where the deadly 
weapon is readily accessible for use; 
(2) knowingly possesses on his person a firearm in any place 
where intoxicating liquor is sold for consumption on the premises; 
(3) being an unemancipated minor under 18 years of age, 
possesses a firearm without the consent of his oarent or guardian; or 
(4) knowingly sells or transfers a firearm to an unemanci­
pated minor under 18 years of age whose parent or guardian has not 
consented to the sale or transfer. 
(b) The provisions of (a)(l) of this section do not apply to a 
person 
(1) who is engaged at the time of his possession in lawful 
hunting, fishing, or other outdoor sporting activity; or 
(2) in his dwelling or on property owned by or leased to him. 
(c) The provisions of (a)(l) of this section do not apply to a 
weapon that 
(1) is carried in a belt or shoulder holster if the holster 
is wholly or partially visible; or 
(2) is carried in a scabbard, sheath, or case designed for 
carrying weapons if the scabbard, sheath, or case is wholly or partially 
visible. 
(d) . The provisior•1s of (q) (2) of this section do not apply to a 
person or his employees in business premises owned by or leased to that 
person. 
(e) Misconduct involving weapons in the third degree is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.71.130. POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS. (a) A person 
commits the crime of possession of burglary tools if he oossesses a 
103. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
I� 
13 
, .. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 I 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
2/ 
28 
29 
LA- L 
WOHK DRAFT PJ\PER WORK ! ·{J\FT PAPER 1-!0 RK DiZ,\ FT P ,'\ 1' ER. 
20A 
burglary tool with the intent to use or permit use of the tool in Lhc 
commission of 
(1) any degree of burglary; 
(2) a crime referred to in AS ll.46.130(a) (3); or 
(3) theft of services. 
(b) As used in this section, "burglary tools" means 
(1) nitroglycerine, dynamite, or any other tool, instrument, 
or device adapted or designed for use in committing a crime referred to 
in (a)(l) - (3) of this section; or 
(2) an acetylene torch, electric arc, burning bar, thermal 
lance, oxygen lance, or other similar device capable o( burning through 
steel, concrete, or other solid material. 
(c) Possession of burglary tools is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 71. 140. CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES. (a) A person 
commits the crime of criminal possession of explosives if he possesses 
or manufactures an explosive substance or device and intends to use that 
substance or device to commit a crime. (b) Criminal possession of explosives is a 
(1) class A felony if the crime intended is murder; 
(2) class B felony if the crime intended is a class A felony; 
(3) class C felony if the crime intended is a class B felony; ( 4) class A misdemeanor if the crime intended is a class C 
felony; 
(5) class B misdemeanor if the crime intended is a class J\ or 
class B misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.71.150. UNLAWFUL FURNISl-llNG OF EXPLOSIVES. (a) A person 
commits the crime of unlawful furnishing of explosives if he furnishes 
an explosive substance or device to another knowing that that person 
intends to use the substance or device to commit a crime. 
104. 
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(b) Unlawful furnishing of explosives is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11.71.160. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter, unless the 
context requires otherwise, 
(1) "deadly weapon" means any firearm, or anything designed 
for and capable of causing death or serious physical injury, ir1cluding 
but not limited to a knife other than an ordinary pocket knife, an axe, 
a club, metal knuckles, or an explosive; 
(2) "deface" means to remove, cover, alter, or destroy the 
manufacturer's serial number; 
(3) "firearm" means a loaded or unloaded pistol, revolver, 
rifle, shbtgun; or other weapon from which a shot capable of causing 
death or serious physical injury may be discharged; "firearm" does not 
include a firearm in a permanently inoperable condition which is kept as 
a curio or museum piece or for educational purposes; 
( 4) "prohibited weapon II means any 
(A) explosive, incendiary, or noxious gas 
(i) mine or device that is designed, made, or 
adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious physical injury 
or death; 
(ii) rocket, other than emergency flare, having a 
propellant charge of more than four ounces; 
(iii) bomb; 
(iv) grenade; 
(B) device designed, made, or adapted to muffle the 
report of a firearm; 
(C) device that consists of finger rings or guards made 
of a hard substance and designed, made, or adapted for inflicting 
serious physical injury or death by striking a person with an en­
closed fist; 
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(D) switchblade or gravity knife; 
(E) firearm that is capable of shooting more than one 
shot a�tomatically, without manual reloading, by a single function 
of the trigger; or 
(F) rifle with a barrel length o f  less than 16 inches or 
shotgun with a barrel length o f  less than 18 inches, or any firearm 
made from a rifle or shotgun which, as modi fied, has an overall 
length of less than 26 inches. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 71. :veapons and Explosives 
COM.1'.1ENTARY 
I. TD AS 11. 71. 100 - . 120. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS 
IN THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.55.010, .020 provide a maximum 100 day jail 
sentence and a fine of $200 for carrying concealed about the 
person "a revolver, pistol, or other firearm, or knife, other 
than an ordinary pocket knife, or dirk or dagger, slingshot, 
metal knuckles, or an instrument by the use of which injury 
could be inflicted upon the person or property of another." 
A person who has been convicted of a felony, assault 
with a dangerous we�pon, burglary, robbery and other similar 
crimes is prohibited by AS 11. 55. 030 from owning, possessing 
or having under his custody or control a "firearm capable of 
being concealed on his person," or carrying "concealed about 
his person a knife with a blade over two inches long or a 
dirk or dagger, slingshot, metal knuckles, or an instrument 
commonly considered to be a weapon. " Violation of this statute 
carries a maximum 5 year sentence and a fine of $500. AS 11. 
55. 040. 
Punishable by a maximum sentence of six months is 
the flourishing, pointing or discharging of a firearm in a 
city, or in or on a "railway coach, steamboat or steamship, 
or in or near a park or public grounds, or at a public place." 
107. 
AS 11. 55. 060 provides a maximum 1 year sentence and a fine 
of �500 for shooting a firearm "at, into, in, through or against" 
certain buildings, while AS 11.55.065 provides the same 
sentence for discharging a firearm "from, on, or across a 
highway." 
A maximum 1 year sentence is provided by AS 11. 55. 070 
for possessing a firearm while under the influence of an intoxi­
cating liquor or drug. AS 11. 15. 295 provides punishment of 
up to 25 years for a person who uses or carries a firearm 
during the commission of a robbery, assault, murder, rape, 
burglary or kidnapping. 
B. The Code Provision 
1. TD AS 11. 71. 100. Misconduct involving weapons 
in the first degree 
Misconduct involving weapons in the first degree is 
the most serious weapons offense in the Code and is classified 
as a class C felony. 
Subsection (a) (1) prohibits a person from possessing 
a firearm capable of being concealed on his person if he has 
been convicted, either inside or outside the state, of a 
felony involving violence. The term firearm is defined in 
TD AS 11. 71.160(3) and consistent with existing law (Davis v. 
State, 499 P. 2d 1025, 1038 (Alaska 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 
415 U. S. 308 (1974)) specifically includes unloaded as well as 
loaded firearms. The term "possess" is defined in the Code's 
general definition section as "having physical possession or 
the exercise of dominion or control over property. " TD AS 11. 
108. 
81.100( ) . As in existing law (see Davis, supra, 499 P.2d 
at 1038 n. 54) the Code requires that the defendant be aware 
of his possession. See TD AS 11. 11.l00(a), . 140(b) (6). 
The proposed statute refers to felonies " involving vio­
lence" and is intended to codify th.at part of 11962] OP. ATT'Y GEN., 
No. 19, which concluded that the existing statute was inapplic-
able to persons convicted of nonviolent felonies. Note that the 
proposed statute does not refer to a felon who carries concealed 
on his person deadly weapons other than firearms. Such conduct 
would be punishabl� under TD AS ll. 71. 120(a) (1), discussed infra. 
The subsection {a) (2) expands existing law by including 
within its prohibitions the person who sells or transfers a 
firearm capable of being concealed on one's person knowing 
th.at the transferee has been convicted of a violent felony. 
The Subcommission concluded that the tranferor who acts with 
such knowledge is equally culpable and deserving of the same 
punishment as the felon. 
Subsection (b) provides that subsections (a) (1) and 
(2) do not apply if the felon has received a pardon or if a 
period of five years, excluding periods of incarceration, has 
elapsed from the date of conviction of the underlying felony and 
the date of the possession, sale or transfer of the firearm. This 
provision is based on existing AS 11. 55. 030 but reduces the 
period by five years. The existing ten year prohibition was 
viewed by the Subcommission as being unduly harsh since the 
livelihood of substantial numbers of Alaskans living in the bush 
may depend on the ability to possess firearms. A five year pro­
hibition shoul d provide a sufficient sanction. 
109. 
Subsection (3) is new to existing law and is pat­
terned after the prohibitions found in the National Firearms 
Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 5801-5872. Key to the prohibition is the 
definition of "prohibited weapon" found in TD AS 11.71.160 (4). 
The definition extends to any (1) explosive, incendiary or 
noxious gas bomb, grenade, rocket or mine; (2) firearm silencers; 
( 3) "brass or metal knuckles"; ( 4) switchblade or gravity knives; 
(5) automatic weapons; and (6) "sawed-off" shotguns and rifles. 
Such weapons have little or no legitimate function, are unneces­
sary for protection and are not commonly used for commercial 
or recreational purposes. Substantial risk of harm to others 
and the furtherance of crime result from private possession 
of such weapons. The conduct proscribed is the manufacture, 
possession, transportation, sale or transfer of the weapon. 
Subsection (c) provides that the prohibitions of subsection (a) 
(2) are inappljcable if possession of the weapon was pursuant 
to registration under the National Firearms Act. 
The Code does not contain a separate offense of 
carrying weapons during the commission of certain crimes. Instead, 
this factor serves to aggravate the substantive offense. For 
example, robbery is aggravated to a class A felony if the 
defendant is armed with a deadly weapon or represents that he 
is so armed. See TD AS 11. 41. 500, discussed in Tentative 
Draft, Part 2, at 80-83. 
2. TD AS 11. 71. 110. Misconduct involving weapons 
in the second degree 
The second degree weapons offense, a class A misde­
meanor, prohibits five forms of conduct, three of which are 
110. 
substantially based on existing law. 
Subsection (a) (1) extends the prohibition of existing 
AS 11. 55. 070, Possession of firearm while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor or drug, to possession of all " deadly 
weapons" as that term is defined in TD AS 11. 71. 160(1). The 
Code provision, however, requires that the person's physical 
or mental condition be substantially impaired, a standard 
that will cover a narrower range of behavior than the existing 
"under the influence" test. Subsection {a) ( 2) expands existing 
law by including within the prohibition the person who sells or 
transfers a deadly weapon to a person knowing that the physical 
or mental condition of that person is substantially impaired. 
Subsection (a) (3) is new to existing law and prohibits 
intentionally defacing a firearm or possessing a firearm knowing 
it has been defaced. "Deface" is defined as "to remove, cover, 
alter, or destroy the manufacturer's serial number. " TD AS 
11. 71.160(2). The defacing of a firearm and the possession of 
a defaced firearm with knowledge that it had been defaced 
were viewed by the Subcomrnission as conduct having no legitimate 
purpose and indicating future use of the firearm in criminal 
activity. 
Subsections (a) (4) and (a) (5) are based substantially 
on existing AS 11. 55. 050, .065. The terms " highway" and 
"public place" are defined in the general definition chapter 
of the Code: 
" Highway" means any road, road right-of-way, street, 
alley, bridge, walk, trail, tunnel, path or similar 
or related facility and includes ferries and all such 
related facilities. 
TD AS 11. 81. 100( ) . 
111. 
" Public place" means a place to which the public or 
a substantial group of persons has access and includes 
highways, transportation facilities, schools, places 
of amusement or business, parks, playgrounds, prisons, 
and hallways, lobbies and other portions of apartment 
houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments 
designed for actual residence. 
TD AS ll. 81. 100 ( ). 
The exclusions in subsection (b) are based on existing 
AS ll.55.050 (b) which allows firearms to be used in state parks 
open to shooting despite the broader prohibition on using a. 
firearm in a city. The exclusions under the Code are broader than 
the existing exclusion in that the Code provision permits the use 
of firearms at shooting ranges, shooting events, hunting areas or 
similar locations or activities. To be within the sporting 
activity exclusion, the firearm use must be specifically author­
ized by law. 
The Code does not retain the existing statute on 
"shooting at buildings." If such conduct occurs in a city, 
it will violate TD AS 11. 71.ll0 (a) (4). In any event, the 
Code provision on reckless endangerment, TD AS 11. 41. 250, will 
cover this conduct if it creates a substantial risk of serious 
physical injury to another person. If injury or death results, 
the person may be charged with assault or homicide. See 
TD AS ll.41.200 (a) (3), Assault in the first degree; TD AS 11. 
41.210 (a) (3), .Assault in the second degree; TD AS 11. 41. l00 (a) (2), 
Murder; TD AS 11.41.120, �anslaughter. 
3. TD AS 11.71.120. Misconduct involving weapons 
in the third degree 
Misconduct involving weapons in the third degree, 
a class B misdemeanor, prohibits four forms of conduct. 
Subsection ( a) ( l) is based on existing AS 11. 55.010 
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and prohibits possessing a concealed deadly weapon on the person 
or any place about the person where the weapon is readily 
accessible for use. The definition of deadly weapon, TD As· 
11. 71. 160 (1), supplemented by the exclusions of TD AS ll. 71. 120 (b) 
and (c) are key to this subsection. 
The definition of "deadly weapon" parallels existing 
law by excluding ordinary pocket knives from its ambit. The 
Subcommission concluded, however, that the existing prohibition 
directed at any "instrument by the use of which injury could 
be inflicted upon the person or property of another" was 
overbroad, since virtually any item, even this volume, 
would be included in this category. Under the Code, the 
concealed weapon must be "designed for and capable of causing 
death or serious physical injury, including but not limited 
to a knife other than an ordinary pocket knife, or axe, club, 
metal knuckles or explosives. " The term firearm is defined 
in TD AS 11. 71. 160 (3). 
The exclusion provided in (b) (1) was added to insure 
that the person engaged in lawful hunting or other outdoor 
sporting activity would not be subjected to prosecution under 
the statute. Carrying a weapon under a parka, for example, 
to prevent it from getting wet should not be subject to criminal 
sanctions if the person is engaged in lawful outdoor sporting 
activity. Note that at the time of the possession the person 
must be engaged in the activity. Thus the exclusion would not 
apply to the concealment of weapons on or about the person 
while the person was on his way to or from the activity. Under 
such circumstances the weapon must be carried in a visible 
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holster or case which gives notice of its contents. 
Subsection (b) (2) provides that the prohibition 
against carrying concealed weapons is also inapplicable when 
the person is in his own dwelling, or on property owned by or 
leased to him. This exclusion only extends to the act of 
carrying the concealed weapon. Any use or threatened use of 
the weapon will be subject to the Code's assault and criminal 
homicide statutes as supplemented by the se ctions defining the 
justifiable use of physical force. 
The final e xemptions in subsection (c) were adde d to 
exclude weapons carried in belt or shoulder holsters, scabbards, 
sheaths or cases designed for carrying weapons if the scabbard, 
sheath or case is wholly or partially visible. If the holster, 
sheath, scabbard or case is at least partially visible , other 
persons are put on notice that the actor may in fact be carrying 
a deadly weapon. 
Note that subsection (a} (1) specifically refers to weap­
ons concealed "in any place about his person where the deadly 
weapon is readily accessible for use. " This provision was in­
cluded by the Subcommission to insure that we apons concealed in
1 
areas such as under the front seat of an automobile or in an un­
locked glove compartment would be prohibited by the subsection. 
The Code provision does not contain the specific 
exclusion found in AS 11. 55.020 applicable to peace officers 
whose duty it is to serve process or make arrests. Such 
conduct as well as the possession by a peace officer of a 
firearm in a place where intoxicating liquor is served (dis­
cussed infra) would be justifiable under the Code's general 
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provision on justification in the performance of public duty, 
TD AS 11.21. 220. 
Subsection (a) (2) is new to existing law. It prohibits 
a person from possessing on his person a firearm in any place 
where intoxicating liquor is sold for consumption on the 
premises. Unlike TD AS 11. 71. ll0(a) (1), it is not required 
that the person's condition be substantially impaired. The 
subsection reflects the determination by the Subcommission that 
firearms and bars do not mix. This conclusion is supported by 
a survey of the arrest records of the Anchorage Police Depart­
ment from 1975-76 compiled by the Criminal Justice Center which 
indicates that 18% of firearm assaults in Anchorage occurred 
in bars. One exclusion to the prohibition is provided. Sub­
section {d) allows the owner of the establishment and his 
employees to possess such weapons. 
Subsections {a) (3) and (4) are also new to existing 
law. The two provisions prohibit the possession of a firearm 
by an unemancipated minor under 18 without the consent of his 
parents and the transfer of a firearm to an unemancipated minor 
under 18 with knowledge that such sale is without the consent 
of the minor's parent or guardian. 
II. TD AS 11. 71. 130. POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS 
The crime of possession of burglary tools is new 
to existing law. The Code provides that it is an A misdemeanor 
to possess, with intent to use, any tool, instrument or device 
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adapted or designed for committing any of three property 
crimes - Burglary, TD AS 11. 46.300 - 310; Theft from the 
person, TD AS ll. 46. l30(a) (3) ; and Theft of services, TD AS 
11.46. 200. 
A preparatory offense, TD AS 11.71.130 is narrowly 
drafted to insure that otherwise innocent conduct does not 
fall within its coverage. The definition of the crime requires 
that the state establish that the defendant possessed the tool 
with intent to use or permit its use in the commission of one 
of the three target crimes. Mere possession "under circumstances 
evincing" that intent is not sufficient. Compare TD AS 11.71. 130 
with N. Y. PENAL LAW§ 140. 35. Additionally, unless the defen­
dant possessed nitroglycerine, dynamite, "an acetylene torch, 
electric arc, burning bar, thermal lance, oxygen lance or 
other similar device capable of burning through steel, concrete, 
or other solid material," the state must establish that the 
tool was "adapted or designed for use" in committing one of the 
three target crimes. The Subcommission specifically rejected 
the phrase "commonly used for committing" to insure that 
possession of items such as screwdrivers, toothpicks or rubber 
gloves would not give rise to prosecution under the statute. 
It should be noted that some instances of possession 
of burglary tools can give rise to an attempted burglary 
prosecution under TD AS 11.31. 100. The crime of possession 
of burglary tools, however, allows official intervention in 
instances where the defendant possesse� the tool with the 
requisite intent, but ha� not yet taken a substantial step 
toward the target offense. 
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III. TD AS 11. 71. 140, . 150. CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES; 
UNLAWFUL FURNISHING OF EXPLOSIVES 
Both Code provisions prohibit unlawful transactions 
with explosives and are new to existing law. The statutes 
provide that the possession of explosives with intent to commit 
a crime and the furnishing of explosives with knowledge that 
the person to whom th.ey are furnished intends to commit a 
crime is subject to criminal penalties. The substantial danger 
of widespread personal injury and property damage resulting 
from the unlawful use of expfosives necessitates specific 
coverage of such conduct. 
The term "explosive" is defined in the general 
definitions chapter of the Code: 
"Explosive" means a chemical compound, mixture 
or device that is commonly used or intended for the 
purpose of producing a chemical reaction resulting 
in a substantially instantaneous release of gas and 
heat, including but not limited to dynamite, blasting 
powder, nitroglycerin, blasting caps and nitrojelly, 
but excluding saleable fireworks as defined in AS 
18.72.050 (4), black powder, smokeless powder, small 
arms ammunition and small arms ammunition primers. 
TD AS 11.81. 100 ( ) . 
As a preparatory crime, TD AS 11.71. 140, Criminal 
possession of explosives, is similar to the Code's general 
attempt statute, TD AS 11.31.100, (discussed in Tentative 
Draft, Part 2, at 69-76).. As noted i.n commentary to the Model 
Penal Code, the combination of an "intent to use'' plus posses­
sion of materials which are specially designed for unlawful 
use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the defendant under 
the circumstances, should not be held insufficient as a matter 
117. 
of law to establish the substantial step requirement for 
attempt. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 5. 01, Comment at 49 (Tent. Draft 
NQ .• 10, 1960). Like the attempt statute, TD AS 11. 71. 140 
requires the state to establish that the defendant intended 
to commit a crime. 
The classification, for sentencing purposes, of 
criminal possession of explosives is identical to attempt and 
is based on the crime intended by the defendant. Punishment is 
generally set at one degree below the target offense. Posses­
sion of explosives with intent to commit a class A felony, for 
example, is classified as a class B felony. 
The crime of unlawful furnishing of explosives, 
TD AS 11. 71. 150, provides that it is a class C felony to 
furnish an explosive substance or device to another knowing 
that the other person intends to use it to commit a crime. 
If it can be established that the defendant furnished the 
explosives "with intent to promote or facilitate the commis­
sion of the offense" the defendant would be legally accountable 
for the crime committed by the person to whom he furnished 
the explosives. TD AS 11. 16.110. 
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CHAPTER 76. MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES. 
Section 
100 Selling or Giving Tobacco to a Minor 
110 Interference with Constitutional Rights 
Sec. 11.76.100. SELLING OR GIVING TOBACCO TO A MINOR. (a) A 
person commits the offense of selling or giving tobacco to a minor if he 
knowingly sells, exchanges, or gives cigarettes, cigars, or tobacco to 
a child under 18 years of age. 
(b) Selling or giving tobacco to a minor is a violation for the 
first offense. Selling or giving tobacco to a minor is a class B mis­
demeanor for the second and each subsequent offense. 
Sec. 11. 76. 110. INTERFERENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. (a) A 
person commits the crime of interference with constitutional rights if 
(1) he injures, oppresses, threatens, or intimidates another 
person with intent to deprive that person of a right, privilege, or 
immunity in fact granted by the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2) he injures, oppresses, threatens, or intimidates another 
person because that person has exercised or enjoyed a right, privilege, 
or immunity in fact granted by the constitution or laws of this state; o 
(3) under color of law, ordinance, or regulation of this 
state or a municipality or other political subdivision of this state, he 
intentionally deprives another of a right, privilege, or immunity in 
fact granted by the constitution or laws of this state. 
(b) In a prosecution under this section, whether the injury, 
oppression, threat, intimidation, or deprivation concerns a right, pri­
vilege, or immunity granted by the constitution or laws of this state is 
a question of law. 
(c) Interference with constitutional rights is a class A misde-
meanor. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 76. Miscellaneous Offenses 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11. 76.100. SELLING OR GIVING OF TOBACCO TO A 
MINOR 
The Code provision restates existing AS 11.60. 080 
and . 090 and requires that the defendant act with the culpable 
mental state of " knowingly." 
II. TD AS 11.76.1 1 0 .  INTERFERENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A. Existing Law 
Two existing statutes, based on 18 U. S.C. § §  241, 
242 (1970) , now prohibi t  conduct that i nterferes with a person's 
exercise of rights guaranteed by state laws or the Alaska 
constitution. Under AS 11. 6 0. 340, Conspiracy against rights 
of persons, a person who conspires with another to " inj ure, 
oppress, threaten or intimidate" another because that person 
seeks to or has exercised or enjoyed a right, privilege, or 
immunity granted by the state constitution or laws, is punishable 
by imprisonment for two years and by a fine of $1,000. AS 
11. 60. 350, Deprivation of rights under color of law, authorizes 
imposi tion �f imprisonment for one year and a fine of $ 1, 000 
on a person who, under color of any political subdivision 
or state law, ordinance or regulation, "wilfully deprives 
another person of a right, privilege or immunity granted by 
the constitution or laws of this state or ... subjects another 
person to different punishments, pains or penalti es because 
of that person ' s  race, color, creed or national origin." Other 
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statutes outside Title 11 authorize penalties for violations 
of specific civil rights. 
practices prohibited). 
See AS 18.80. 200-.250 (discriminatory 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code provision consolidates the two existing 
statutes into a single provision, classified as an A misde­
meanor entitled " Interference with constitutional rights." 
Subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) substantially incor­
porate AS 11. 60.340 but unlike existing law, do not require 
that the defendant conspire with another. By a narrow majority, 
the Subcornmission decided that interference with constitutional 
rights should not be included as a target offense in TD AS 
11.31.120, the Code's limited conspiracy statute. Subcornmission 
members generally felt that while the developing concept of 
rights guaranteed by the state constitution needed. protection, 
the risks inherent in the application of conspiracy law to 
very generally described conduct outweighed possible benefits 
in protecting those rights. 
Elimination of the existing conspiracy requirement 
simultaneously broadens the coverage of the statute while 
restricting its application to conduct that achieves the 
unlawful objective of interference with protected rights. A 
single defendant, acting with the requisite intent, who injures, 
oppresses, threatens or intimidates another, or engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission 
of such acts, will be subject to criminal penalties under the 
Code, irrespective of whether he has conspired with another. 
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On the other hand, a person who conspires with another to injure, 
oppress, threaten or intimidate a third person either with 
intent to deprive that third person of a protected right or 
because he has exercised such a right, will not be subj ect to 
criminal penalties unless he has completed the "substantial 
step" necessary for attempt. See TD AS 11. 31 . 100. 
Subsection (a) (3) parallels existing AS 11. 60.350 
and requires that the defendant, acting under color of a law, 
ordinance, or regulation of the state or one of its political 
subdivisions, "intentionally deprive another of a right, privilege 
or immunity, " granted by state law or the state constitution. 
When engaged in by a public servant, conduct similar to that 
prohibited by (a) (3) would also constitute official misconduct 
under TD AS 11. 56. 850. 
Note that subsection (a) (3) does not carry forward 
the specific reference to one who "subjects another person to 
different punishments, pains, or penalties because of that 
person ' s  race, color, creed, or national origin. " The right to 
be free from such discrimination is specifically guaranteed by 
Art. I § § 1, 3 of the Alaska Constitution and thus is covered 
by the broader language "right, privilege or immunity granted 
by the constitution or laws of this state. " 
While TD AS 11. 76. 110 generally requires that the 
defendant act intentionally, use of the phrase "in fact" to 
describe the rights protected under the Code provision means 
the defendant need not be aware that the right, privilege 
or immunity with which he is interfering is of statutory or 
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constitutional origin.  This conforms with case law under the 
parallel federal statute . See, Screws v .  United States, 325 
U. S. 91 (1945) in which the Supreme Court held that to be li able 
under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), a defendant must act intentionally 
and with reference to the consti tutional rights of hi s victims, 
but he need not know that their rights were i n  fact of consti­
tutional or statutory origin. Under subsection (b), whether 
the right, privilege or immunity i s  " in fact" secured by the 
constitution or laws of the state is a question of law rather 
than one for jury determination. 
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APPENDIX I 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapters 06, 21, 26, 46 (Articles 1, 3, 5 and 6) , 51, 
56 (Article 6), 61 and 76 
DERIVATIONS 
CHAPTER 06 - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
TD AS 11. 06.100 - Gene ral Purposes 
This section is based on ORS 161. 025. 
TD AS 11. 06. 110 - Application of Title 11 
This se ction is based on ORS 161. 035. 
TD AS 11. 06.120 - Limitation on Applicability 
This section is based on ORS 161.045. 
TD AS 11. 06. 130 - All Offenses Defined by Statute 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT . § 701- 102. 
TD AS 11. 06. 140, 150 - Burde n of Injecting the 
Issue ; Affi rmative De fense 
These sections are base d on MO. REV . STAT. § 5 56.0 5 1 ,  
. 056 (effective January 1, 1979). 
CHAPTER 21· - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION 
TD AS 11. 21.220 - Justification :  Performance of 
Public Duty 
This se ction is based on ARI Z .  REV. STAT. § 13-402 
(effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
TD AS 11. 21. 230 - Justification:  Use of Physical 
Force - Special Re lationships 
This section is based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-403 
(effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
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holding 
TD AS 11.21.240 - Duress 
This section is based on N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 40.00. 
TD AS 11.21.250 - Entrapment 
This section is based on the Alaska Supreme Court's 
in Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 '(Alaska 1969). 
CHAPTER 26 - RESPONSIBILITY 
The two statutes in this chapter are based on existing 
AS 12.45.083(a), (b) and AS 12.45.085. 
CHAPTER 46 - OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
ARTICLE 1 - THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.46.280 - Issuing a Bad Check 
This section is based on N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 190.05(1) (a), 
190.10(1), 190.50(1). 
ARTICLE 3 - ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.46.488 - Littering 
This section is based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-603 
(effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
ARTICLE 5 - BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.46.710 - Deceptive Business Practices 
This section is based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-2202, 
2203 (effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
TD AS 11.46.720 - Misrepresentation of Use of 
Propelled Vehicle 
This section is based on AS 11.45.471(18). 
TD AS 11.46.730 - Defrauding Secured Creditors 
This section is based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2204 
(effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
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TD AS 11.46.740 - Defrauding Judgment Creditors 
This section is based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2205 
(effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
TD AS 11.46. 750 - Fraud in Insolvency 
This section is based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2206 
(effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
ARTICLE 6 - CREDIT CARD OFFENSES 
This article is based on existing AS 11.22. 
CHAPTER 51 - OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY 
TD AS 11.51.100 - Endangering the Welfare of a Oinor 
in the First Degree 
This section is based on ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2407. 
TD AS 51.110 - Endangering the Welfare of a Minor in 
the Second Degree 
This section is based on OR. REV. STAT. § 163.545 
and ANCHORAGE, AK., PENAL CODE§ 8.05.060 (1977). 
TD AS 51.120 - Criminal Nonsupport 
This section is based on existing AS 11.35.010. 
TD AS 11.51.125 - Failure to Permit Visitation with 
Minor Child 
This section is based on existing AS 11.36.010. 
TD AS 11.51.130 - Contributing to the Delinquency of 
a Minor 
This section is based on ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2406(a) 
TD AS 11.51.135 - Unlawful Exploitation of a Child 
This section is based on ANCHORAGE, AK., PENAL CODE 
§ 8 • 0 5 • 4 2 5 (1 9 7 7 ) • 
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TD AS 11.51.140 - Unlawful Marrying 
Subsection (a) (1) is based on OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 163.515. Subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) are based on 
existing AS 11.40.050. 
TD AS 11.51.150 - Failure to Comply with Order of 
Peace Officer to Leave Dwelling 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906(1)-(4). 
CHAPTER 56 - OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC AD�1INISTRATION 
ARTICLE 6 - ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 
TD AS 11.56.850 - Official Misconduct 
This section is based on N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 195.00. 
TD AS 11.56.860 - Misuse of Confidential Information 
This section is based on existing AS 39.51.010. 
CHAPTER 61 - OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 
ARTICLE l - RIOT, DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.61.100 - Riot 
This section is based on GR. REV. STAT. § 166.015 
and S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1834 (1977). 
TD AS 11.61.110 - Disorderly Conduct 
Subsections (a), (c) are based on existing AS 11.45.030. 
Subsection (b) is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1101(2). 
TD AS 11.61.120 - Harassment 
Subsections (a) (1), (2) are based on existinq AS 11.45.035. 
Subsection (a) (3) is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106(b). 
TD AS 11.61.130 - Abuse of a Corpse 
This section is based on ME. REV. STAT. tit 17A, § 508. 
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TD AS 11.61.140 - Cruelty to Animals 
This section is based on ME. REV. STAT. tit 17A, 
§ 510(l)(B.), (l)(D), (3). 
TD AS 11. 61.150 - Obstruction of Highways 
Subsection (a) (1) is based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 13-1603(1) (effective Oct. 1, 1978). Subsection (a) (2) is 
based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1105(1). Subsection (b) is based 
on ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1603(3) (effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
ARTICLE 2 - OFFENSES AGAINST PRIVACY OF COMMUNJCATIONS 
TD AS 11.61.200 - Eavesdropping 
This section is based on existing AS ll.60.290(a). 
TD AS 11.61.210 - Interception of Private Correspondence 
This section is based on existing AS 11.20.660 and 
AS 42.20.090. 
TD AS 11.61.220 - Unauthorized Divulgence or Use of 
Communications 
This section is based on existing AS 11.60.280. 
TD AS 11.61. 230 - Exemptions 
This section is based on existing AS 11.60.300. 
TD AS 11.61.240 - Definitions 
Subsections (1)-(3), (5) are based on existing AS 
11.60. 280-300. Subsections (4), (6) are based on S. 1437, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1526 (d), (c) (1977). 
CHAPTER 76 - MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.76.100 - Selling or Giving of Tobacco to a 
Minor 
This section is based on existing AS 11.60.080. 
TD AS 11.76.110 - Interference with Constitutional Rights 
This section is based on existing AS 11.60.340, 350 and 
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1501, 1502 (1977). 
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APPENDIX II 
AMENDMENTS TO CODE PROVISIONS 
APPEARING IN 
TENTATIVE DRAFT, Parts l - 3 
The-following substantive amendments have been made 
by the Subcommission to proposed statutes appearing in Tentative 
Draft, Parts l - 3. The amendments primarily reflect changes 
recommended by the Alaska Bar Association Standing Committee 
on Criminal Law. 
Additions in underlines 
Deletions in [CAPITAL BRACKETS] 
Tentative Draft, Part l 
Sec. 11.41.200. ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of assault in the first degree when 
(1) with intent to cause physical injury to another 
person he causes [OR ATTE�PTS TO CAUSE] physical injury to any 
person by means of a deadly weapon; 
Sec. 11.41.210. ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of assault in the second degree when 
(1) with intent to cause physical injury to another 
person he causes [OR ATTEMPTS TO CAUSE] physical injury to 
another person by means of a dangerous instrument;. 
(4) he intentionally places [OR ATTEMPTS TO PLACE] 
another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by 
means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 
Sec. 11.41.230. ASSAULT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree when. 
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(4) by word or conduct he intentionally places [OR 
ATTEMPTS TO PLACE] another person in fear of imminent physical 
injury. 
Sec. 11.41.310. KIDNAPPING IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under 
(a) of this section that . . . 
(2) the [SOLEJ primary intent of the defendant is 
to assume [CONTROL] custody of that person; 
Sec. 11.41.320. CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE IN THE SECOND 
DEGREE. 
(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a 
class [A] B misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 41. 34 O. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT IN THE FIRST DEGREE. 
(b) Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree is a class 
[A MISDEMEANOR] C felony. 
Sec. 11. 41. 350. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under 
(a) of this section that 
(1) the person restrained is less than [12] 18 years 
old; . . . 
(3) his [SOLE] primary intent is to assume [CONTROL] 
custody of the child; 
(c) Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree is a class 
[Bl A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.41.360. COERCION. (a) A person commits the 
crime of coercion if he compels or induces another person to 
engage in conduct from which the other person has a legal right 
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to abstain, or to abstain from �ngaging in conduct in which 
the other person has a legal right to engage, by instilling in 
him a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor 
or another will carry out a threat. 
Subsections (a) (1)- (10), (b) and (c) are deleted. The 
term "threat" will be defined in the general definition section 
of the Code. The definition of "threat" now appears in TD AS 
11.46.990(10). 
"threat" means 
(A) a mnnace, however comnur..icated, to 
(i) cause physical injury in the future 
to a person; 
(ii) cause damage to property; 
(iii) subject a person to physical confine­
ment or restraint; 
[(iv) ENGAGE IN OTHER CONDUCT CONSTITUTING 
A CRI.ME;] 
[(v) ] (iv) accuse a person of a crime or 
cause criminal charges to be instituted against a 
person; 
[ (vi) ] (�) expose a secret or publicize 
an asserted fact, whether true or false, tencting to 
subject a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule or 131. 
to impair his credit or business repute; 
[(vii)] (vi) testify or provide information or 
withhold testimony or information with respect to 
another's legal claim or defense; 
[ (viii) ] (vii) use or abuse one's position as a 
public servant by performing so�e act within or 
related to his official duties, or by failing or 
refusing to perform an official duty, in such �anner 
as to affect some person adversely; 
[(ix)] (viii) bring about or continue a stri!:e, 
boycott or other collective action, if the property 
is not demanded or received for the benefit of the 
group in whose interest the actor purports t6 act; or 
[(x)] (ix) inflict any other harm which woul<l 
not benefit the person making the threat; 
(B) the offer to protect another person fror  an 
act described in (A) of this paragraph when the offerer 
has no apparent means to provide the protection or when the 
price asked for rendering the protective service is grossly 
disproportionate to its cost to the offeror. 
(C) An expression of intent to enga0e in conduct 
described in subsections ( 7\) (iv) , (v) is not a threat if 
made in the reasonable belief that the charge, secret or 
other fact is true and with the sole intent 
( i) to obtain property claimed as restitu-
tion, indemnification for har� 0one or lawful compen­
sation for property or services in the circumstances 
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to which the accusation or exposure relates; or 
(ii) to compel or induce the victim to 
take reasonable action to correct the wrong which is 
the subject of the charge, secret or other fact or to 
refrain from committing an offense. 
Sec. 11.41.410. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of sexual assault in the first degree 
if 
(1) being any age, he knowingly engages in sexual 
penetration with a person without consent of that person or 
in attempting to do so causes serious physical injury to that 
person. 
Sec. 11.41.450. INDECENT EXPOSURE. (a) A person commits 
the crime of indecent exposure if he intentionally exposes 
[DIRECTLY OR THROUGH CLOTHING, ] his genitals, buttock, or anus, 
[OR DIRECTLY EXPOSES HER FEMALE BREAST] to another with reckless 
disregard for the offensive, provocative, or insulting effect 
the act may have on that person. 
(b) Indecent exposure is a class A misdemeanor. 
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Sec. 11.16.110. LIABILITY BASED UPON THE CONDUCT OF 
ANOTHER: COMPLICITY. 
(c) The defense provided by (a) (3) of this section is 
an affirmative defense. A renunciation under (a) (3) of this 
section is not "voluntary and complete" if it is substantially 
motivated in whole or in part by. 
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Sec. 11.16. 130. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ORGANIZA'I'IONS. 
(a) An organization is guilty of an offense if 
(1) the conduct constituting the offense is engaged 
in by an agent of the organization while acting within the 
scope of his employment [OR] and in behalf of the organization. 
(3) the conduct constituting the offense . . . acting 
within the scope of his employment [OR] and in behalf of the 
organization. 
Sec. 11.21. 150. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE 
IN DEFENSE OF PREMISES. 
[(C) A PERSON MAY USE OR THREATEN TO USE PHYSICAL FORCE 
UPON ANOTHER PERSON WHEN AND TO THE EXTENT HE REASONABLY BELIEVES 
IT NECESSARY TO TERMINATE WHAT HE REASONABLY BELIEVES TO BE A 
BURGLARY IN A DWELLING OR OCCUPIED BUILDING. ] 
(c) A person in possession or control of a dwelling or 
building, or an express or implied agent of that person, may 
use or threaten to use physical force upon another when and 
to the extent he reasonably believes it necessary to terminate 
what he reasonably believes to be a burglary occurring in an 
occupied dwelling or building. 
Sec. 11. 21. 170. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE BY 
PEACE OFFICER IN MAKING AN ARREST OR PREVENTING AN ESCAPE. 
(a) In addition to using or threatening to use physica l force 
authorized under other sections of this chapter, a peace officer 
is, subject to the provisions of (b), [AND] (c) and (d) of this 
section. 
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(b) A peace officer in effecting an arrest or in preventing 
an escape from custody is justified in using deadly physical 
force only when 
(1) deadly physical force is authorized under other 
sections of this chapter; or 
(2) the peace officer reasonably  believes it necessary 
to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of a person he 
reasonably believes 
(A) has committed or attempted to commit a felony 
involving the use or threatened use of physical force 
against a person; 
(B) is attempting to escape while in possession 
of a [DEADLY WEAPON] firearm on or about his person; or 
[ (C) MAY OTHERWISE ENDANGER LIFE OR INFLICT 
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY UNLESS ARRESTED WITHOUT DELAY.] 
(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly  physical 
force in making a lawful st9p only when the use of deadly 
physical force is authorized under other sections of this chapter. 
[ (c) ] (d) 
TD AS 11.56.200. PERJURY 
(c) Perjury is a class [A] f felony. 
TD AS 11.56.230. PERJURY BY INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. 
(c) Perjury by inconsistent statements is a class [B] 
C felony. 
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Sec. 11.46.120. DEFENSE [S] [TO THEFT] PRECLUDED. 
[ (A) IN A PROSECUTION FOR THEFT, IT IS A DEFENSE THAT TI-IE 
PERSON ACTED UNDER AN HONEST CLAIM OF RIGHT IN THAT 
( l) HE Y-JAS UNAWARE THAT THE PROPERTY �VAS TllA'I' OF 
ANOTHER; OR 
( 2) HE REASONABLY BELIEVED THAT HE WAS EN'I'I'I'LE') T'J 
THE PROPERTY OR WAS AUTHORIZED TO DISPOSE OF IT AS HE DID.] 
[(b)] (a) In a prosecution for theft, it is not a defense 
that the property involved is that of the defendant's spouse� 
[UNLESS THE PROPERTY 
(1) DOES NOT CONSTITUTE HOUSEHOLD BELONGINGS; OR 
(2) CONSTITUTES HOUSEHOLD B�LONGINGS BUT IS THE 
SUBJECT OF THEFT WHILE THE PAR'rIES ARE MAINTAINING SEPARATE 
HOUSEHOLDS AND WITHOUT A CLAIM OF RIGHT MADE IN GOOD FAITH. 
(C) IN (b) OF THIS SECTION, "HOUSEHOLD BELONGINGS" MEANS 
FURNITURE, PERSONAL EFFECTS, VEHICLES, MONEY, OR ITS EQUIVALENT 
IN AMOUNTS CUSTOMARILY USED FOR HOUSEHOLD PURPOSES AND OTHER 
PROPERTY USUALLY FOUND IN AND ABOUT THE COMMON DWELLING AND 
ACCESSIBLE TO ITS OCCUPANTS. 
(D) IT IS NOT A DEFENSE TO A PROSECUTION FOR THEFT THAT 
THE PERSON FROM WHOM THE PROPERTY WAS TAKEN, APPROPRIATED, 
OBTAINED OR WITHHELD HIMSELF OBTAINED THE PROPERTY BY MEANS 
OF THEFT.] 
Sec. 11. 46. 990 ( 8) . "property of another" means property 
in which a person has an interest which the actor is not privileged 
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to infringe, whether or not the actor also has an interest in the 
property [.] and whether or not the person from whom the property 
was taken, appropriated, obtained or withheld himself obtained 
the property by means of theft . .  
Sec. 11.46.190. THEFT BY RECEIVING. 
f(d) IN ADDITION TO THE CRIMINAL PENALTY PROVIDED IN 
SECS. 130-150 OF THIS CHAPTER, A PERSON WHO COMMITS THEFT BY 
RECEIVING IS LIABLE IN A CIVIL ACTION TO THE mvNER OF THE 
STOLEN PROPERTY FOR THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES 
SUSTAINED BY HIM BY THE LOSS OF THE PROPERTY, AS WELL AS ALL 
COSTS AND REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES.] 
Sec. 11.46.195. EXTORTION. 
[(B) IN A PROSECUTION BASED UPON A THREAT AS DEFINED IN 
SEC. 990(10) (A) (v) OF THIS CHAPTER, IT IS AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE THAT THE DEFENDANT REASONABLY BELIEVED THE THREATENED 
CHARGE TO BE TRUE AND THAT HIS SOLE INTENT ivAS TO COMPEL OR 
INDUCE THE VICTIM TO TAKE REASONABLE ACTION TO CORRECT THE 
WRONG WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE THREATENED CHARGE.] 
Sec. 11.46.240. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A PROPELLED VEHICLE. 
[ (c) \vHEN A MINOR IS ACCUSED OF A VIOLATION UNDER THI� 
SECTION, HE !111\Y BE CHARGED, PROSECUTED AND SEN�ENCED IN THE 
SAME MANNER AS AN ADULT EXCEPT THAT A P,Z\RENT, GUARDIAN OR LEGAL 
CUSTODIAN SHALL BE PRESENT AT ALL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE MINOR.] 
Sec. 11.46.250. UNAUTHORIZED OCCUPANCY OF A PROPELLED 
VEHICLE. (a) A person commits the crime of unauthorized 
occupancy of a propel led vehicle if he rides in a propelled 
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vehicle [WHICH, AT THE TIME HE ENTERED IT, HE KNEW OR HAD BEEN 
INFORMED THAT THE VEHICLE HAD] with reckless disregard that it 
had been stolen or was being used or was to be used in violation 
of sec. 240 of this chapter. 
SEC. 11.46.415. DEFENSE TO SECS. 400 AND 410 OF THIS 
CHAPTER. (a) In a prosecution under sec. 400 (a) (1) or 410 
of this chapter, it is a defense that all persons havinq posses­
sory or proprietary interests in the property consente� to the 
starting of the fire or explosion. The defendant has the burden 
of injecting the issue of a defense under this section. 
Sec. 11.46.990(2) "deception" 
(A) means to knowingly 
(i) create or confirm another's false 
impression [OF] including false impressions as to 
law, value. 
[ (B) DOES NOT INCLUDE FALSITY AS TO .�1A'I'TERS 
HAVING NO PECUNIARY SIGNIFICANCE, OR PUFFING BY STATE�1ENTS 
UNLIKELY TO DECEIVE ORDINARY PERSONS In THE GROUP ADDRESSED;] 
(B) In any prosecution for an offense that requires 
"deception" as an element, it is not a defense that the defendant 
deceived or attempted to deceive a machine. For purposes of this 
section "machine" includes but is not limited to a vending machine, 
computer, turnstile and automated teller machine. 
Sec. 11.46.180. THEFT BY DECEPTION. 
(b) In a prosecution for theft by �eception 
(1) the terrn "deception" does not include falsity 
as to matters having no pecuniary significance or "puffing" 
138 . 
by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the 
group addressed. 
[(b) IN A PROSECUTION FOR THEFT BY DECEPTION, ] 
(2) the defendant's intention or belief that a promise 
would not be performed shall not be established solely by or 
inferred solely from the fact that the promise was not performed. 
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